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EMPLOYEE SAY-ON-PAY: MONITORING AND LEGITIMIZING
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Robert J. Rhee †

Abstract
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in
corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of
employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two
considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced
agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive
compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader
economy.
If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive
performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market
mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share
price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive
managers in particular can better monitor the company and senior
executives, based on inside knowledge and a longer term horizon, than
diffuse, diversified, and short durational shareholders. Employees
collectively possess the corporation’s entire information content; the
assessment derived there from would be relevant to the board’s
assessment of executive performance and pay.
On the level of political economy, employee approval would
legitimate executive pay in the current social, economic, and political
environment in which executive compensation and income disparities
have touched public consciousness. Executive compensation is no longer
purely a matter of private contracting. Prominent economists have linked
excessive pay to economic inequity, a pressing issue of public
consciousness today. Employees are a major constituent of the corporate
system and our political society. They can act as surrogate public monitors
and perform a gatekeeping function of good corporate governance.
John H. and Mary Lou Dasburg Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin
College of Law; Professor, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School. I thank the many
colleagues who read this paper and provided helpful comments.
†
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Structured properly and achieved fairly as to the executive, employee sayon-pay would politically legitimate executive compensation and income
disparity at both the firm and political levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation started to rise significantly in the 1980s, and
the 1990s experienced explosive growth that rapidly outpaced the pay of
the corporate and broader American workforce.1 Executive compensation
is one of the most controversial topics in corporate governance. 2 The
absolute amount of pay has created wide income disparity between top
executives and the average worker. 3 The pay problem has created a
shared perception that pay is decoupled from performance and a broad
sense of social equity. The legitimacy and efficacy of the corporate
governance system are in question. Executive pay affects both firm
efficiency and social equity in a market society. Compensation influences
incentives, which affects production and wealth allocation. A prevailing
public sense that wages are not fairly allocated affects morale and social
cohesion at both the firm and the societal levels.4 Prominent economists
have identified executive compensation as a “powerful force” 5 for
economic inequitable and social “exploitation” 6 of wealth allocation
See Lawrence Mishel & Natalie Sabadish, CEO Pay and the Top 1%: How Executive
Compensation and Financial-Sector Pay Have Fueled Income Inequality, ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTITUTE, Issue Brief #331, at 6 fig. A (May 2, 2012) (showing historical growth of CEO
pay as a multiple of average worker pay since 1965); Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks,
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. OF
FIN. STUDIES 2099 (2010) (showing that compensation was flat from 1940s to 1970s, but
that pay became more correlated to shareholder wealth since the 1980s).
2
See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (criticizing executive
compensation practices).
3
See Steven N. Kaplan & Josua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes
to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 1004 (2010) (identifying
executive compensation as one major source of the increasing income disparity seen in
the last several decades)
4
See ROBERT W. KOLB, TOO MUCH IS NOT ENOUGH: INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 162 (2012) (arguing that “there is a growing awareness of the potential for
rising inequity to seriously corrode social cohesion”); William Lazonick, Why Executive
Pay Matters to Innovation and Inequity, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 415 (eds. Cynthia Williams and Peer Zumbansen, 2011)
(arguing that manipulation of executive pay has resulted in economic inequity, reduced
innovation, and unstable economic performance).
5
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 334 (2014).
6
“In a more careful, academic way of putting it I would say that one of the
explanations of what is going on is increased exploitation. You see the ratio of wages to
productivity going way down, and that certainly is consistent with increased exploitation.
And you see that the ratio of CEO pay to worker pay has gone up. So what I would say is
that some of the explanations have to do with weakened worker bargaining power,
1
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through the abuse of corporate power.7 Concentrated wealth affects the
working of the larger economy and social welfare.8 Business scholars have
called for a “new paradigm” on executive compensation. 9 Given this
business, economic, and political reality, the current controversy over the
compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) will not recede into a
private corner of corporate governance with the passage of time unless the
problem is fixed.
Executive compensation has entered a new era. Until a few years ago,
compensation was not regulated in any meaningful way. It was a matter
of private contracting for the employment of the top corporate officer. The
Dodd-Frank Act now regulates CEO pay across U.S. public companies.
weaker unions, asymmetric state liberalization where capital moves but labor can’t move,
corporate governance laws that provide relatively little check on abuses of corporate
power by CEOs, and an increase of monopoly power because of network externalities.”
Lynn Parramore, Joseph Stiglitz on Why the Rich Are Getting Richer -- and Why It Could Get
Much Worse, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting Stiglitz), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lynn-parramore/joseph-stiglitz-on-whyth_b_6354948.html.
7
See PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334 (“[T]he extremely generous rewards meted out to
top managers can be a powerful force for divergence of the wealth distribution: if the best
paid individuals set their power salaries, (at least to some extent), the result may be
greater and greater inequity.”); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW
TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 66-67 (2013) (providing an account of
income inequity in the U.S. and asserting excessive executive pay as one of the causes);
Mishel & Sabadish, supra note 1 (arguing that executive compensation and financialsector pay have caused income inequity).
8
The credit rating agency, Standard & Poor’s, has warned of the serious
consequences of income inequity, which has been factored into bottom line projection of
economic growth: “At extreme levels, income inequality can harm sustained economic
growth over long periods. The U.S. is approaching that threshold. Standard & Poor's sees
extreme income inequality as a drag on long-run economic growth. We've reduced our
10-year U.S. growth forecast to a 2.5% rate. We expected 2.8% five years ago.” Joe
Maguire, How Increasing Inequity Is Dampening U.S. Economic Growth, and Possible Ways to
Change the Tide, GLOBAL CREDIT PORTAL (S&P Capital IQ, Aug. 5, 2014), available at
https://www.globalcreditportal.com/ratingsdirect/renderArticle.do?articleId=1351366
&SctArtId=255732&from=CM&nsl_code=LIME&sourceObjectId=8741033&sourceRevId=
1&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20240804-19:41:13. According to the World Bank, the 2013 GDP
of
the
United
States
was
$16.768
trillion.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_20
13+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc. A 0.3% decline in economic
growth from 2.8% to 2.5% would imply a reduction in GDP of $50 billion per annum
based on the 2013 GDP figure.
9
See Jay W. Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, The Pay Problem: Time for a New Paradigm for
Executive Compensation, in THE FUTURE OF BOARDS: MEETING THE GOVERNANCE
CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 77 (2012).
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The statute mandates third-party review of the compensation package,
which is shareholder say-on-pay.10 Since this reform measure is fairly new,
its efficacy remains to be seen in the years to come. 11 Irrespective of
whether most voting outcomes approve proposed pay packages (the short
but predictable experience thus far), shareholder say-on-pay is a good
thing because shareholders now have a legal right to participate in the pay
decision. Their opinion is relevant to the board’s deliberation, and more
relevant information is better than less in informed decisionmaking.
Shareholder monitoring may prove to have longterm salutary effects.
Yet even as the ink is drying on the Dodd-Frank Act, the limits of
shareholder monitoring are well known. Many diffused, diversified, and
short durational shareholders in modern capital markets are rationally
disengaged from corporate governance.12 Furthermore, shareholders are
one of many contractual constituents of the firm.13 One conception of a
firm is a “nexus of contracts” among various factors of production.14 This
nexus includes not only top level officers and the board, but also nonexecutive managers and rank and file employees who contribute to the
production function of the firm. 15 However, the framework of U.S.
corporate governance as practiced assumes that employees are simply
contractual workers hired to produce widgets as directed by corporate
managers in a top-down hierarchy. This assumption would dismiss a
potentially important benefit that could be gained. As a group, employees
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010).
11
See Randall S. Thomas et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An
Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967 (2013) (providing
preliminary empirical data on voting results); Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say
On Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 1213 (2012) (same).
12
See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-400 (1986) (discussing the
problem of the rationally apathetic shareholder); Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap
Between Ownership and Control, 34 J. CORP. L. 409, 422 (2009) (noting that increasing
shareholder involvement is difficult because “the common shareholder today only has a
minimal financial interest in numerous different corporations”).
13
See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 384 (1937). See also Michael
Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (1976)
(“There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts)
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs
and the consumers of output.”).
14
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13.
15
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
10
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possess all of the information content of the company.16 This obvious fact
is something that cannot be claimed by shareholders or an efficient capital
market where only publicly disclosed information is incorporated into the
stock price. Thus, employees possess the capability to assess the
performance of the corporation and CEO.
This Article proposes extending the say-on-pay device to employees.
The advisory votes of shareholders and employees can provide important
and different information to the board. Two distinct benefits inure from a
right of employees to participate in pay decisions. From a microeconomic
perspective of the firm, employees have great incentive to monitor the
company and have private information relevant to the performance of the
company and its senior executives. This collective incentive and
information should be leveraged. From a political economic perspective,
employee say-on-pay would politically legitimate executive compensation.
This aspect is important because executive compensation is no longer a
purely private matter akin to contracting for the labor of most other
employees. One significant factor in growing economic inequity is high
executive compensation. 17 The political and economic dimensions of
permitting employee voice in executive compensation are significant. 18
Employees would act as surrogate public monitors of executive pay and
gatekeepers of good corporate governance in this regard.19
This is the first scholarly article proposing employee say-on-pay.20
The idea here may be viewed as controversial, or perhaps even radical,
See PHILLIP PHAN, TAKING BACK THE BOARDROOM: THRIVING AS A 21ST-CENTURY
DIRECTOR 3 (2007) (“There is increasingly realization that a firm is a place where people
meet to exchange specific information for the purpose of engaging in production.”).
17
See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 66-67; PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334.
18
See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 75-105 (1970) (analyzing the economic relationship
between participatory voice and loyalty).
19
See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 916 (1998).
20
Upon researching for preemption, I came across two brief references to the
possibility of employees say on executive pay in the popular press. See Justin Fox, Who
Should Actually Have Say on Pay?, HBR BLOG NETWORK (May 30, 2013) (“If we wanted to
have a real impact on executive pay levels, we should probably have employees vote.”)
(emphasis in original), available at http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/05/who-should-actuallyhave-say-on-pay/; Deborah Hargreaves, Employees Need a Say on Executive Pay, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2012) (“That is why we believe employees need more of a say on
pay.”). Cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Employees, Too, Want a Say on the Boss’s Pay, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2012) (suggesting that employee-shareholders in ESOPs should have say-onpay).
16

6-58

since American corporate governance revolves around the triad of board,
management, and shareholder. Among these constituents, management,
at least, will not view employee say-on-pay warmly. Employees have little
formal role in U.S. corporate governance under corporation law. 21 The
tension between these principles and the proposal here is more apparent
than real. The proposal is consistent with one of the most fundamental
tenet of corporate governance, which is informed decisionmaking at the
board level. The controversy of the idea would be political in nature.22
While political consideration is important, it is only one facet of the nature
of the problem, and a separate inquiry from whether the idea is
economically and legally sound. Furthermore, since say-on-pay is a global
corporate governance phenomenon, originating in the United Kingdom
and rapidly adopted by many economically advanced countries in Europe
before landing on American shores, the idea of employee say-on-pay
should be put on the agenda of the global debate on pay, including in
countries where employees traditionally have had greater participatory
role in the governance of the corporation.23
To frame the analysis that follows, a few prefatory comments are
warranted. This Article is about institutional design. It is not written to
advance a broader agenda of expanding employee role in American
corporate governance from nothing to something, or comingling labor and
corporation laws.24 This proposal is instrumental, advancing the use of an
established governance device to better monitor senior executives, which
See Harry W. Arthurs & Claire Mummé, From Governance to Political Economy:
Insights from a Study of Relations Between Corporations and Workers, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 350 (eds. Cynthia Williams
and Peer Zumbansen, 2011) (“The presumption is that workers will not participate in the
making of important decisions, including many which directly and dramatically affect
their interests.”); MARGARET M. BLAIR & MARK J. ROE, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 2 (1999) (“Labor directly influences corporate governance structures in the
United States less than it does is [sic] in some other countries.”). See generally GREGORY K.
DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS’ CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2003)
(analyzing employees’ role in corporate governance); BLAIR & ROE (same); MICHAEL
LOWER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE: A LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS (2010)
(same). In Europe, employees have a greater role in corporate governance. See Blair &
Roe, at 163-313 (discussing the German and Japanese models).
22
See infra Section IV.E (discussing the political objection of the executive class).
23
European countries use employee participation in corporate governance more
than the US model. See ROE & BLAIR, at 163-238.
24
Some scholars have sought to explore greater role for employees in formal
corporate governance. See Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate
Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (2011); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008).
21
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is a basic function of corporate governance. The basic premise of the
Article is that there is a problem of excessive compensation, and the
problem arises from failed arm’s length bargaining between the board and
the CEO. 25 The questions explored here are whether the concept of sayon-pay can be extended to other third-party constituents, and whether the
benefits of such a device outweigh potential problems. The logical force of
the proposal is apparent if one acknowledges, as one must, that
employees possess the corporation’s entire information content and this
information is relevant to the board’s decision on performance and pay.
This Article is written in four sections. Section I provides brief
background information on shareholder say-on-pay as mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act. It discusses the empirical data on shareholder voting
results, and identifies the recurrent problem of rational shareholder
apathy. Section II proposes the concept of employee say-on-pay and
discusses the scheme’s structure and implementation. The most intricate
issue of implementation is how votes should be allocated to meet the twin
goals of firm efficiency and social equity. Second III identifies the benefits
of employee say-on-pay, including monitoring and modulating executive
compensation and decreasing income and wealth disparity in American
society. Section IV discusses potential objections to the proposal, including
whether the informational input would be reliable and whether employee
say-on-pay would tilt the balance in corporate governance away from
shareholders to employees.
I. SHAREHOLDER SAY-ON-PAY
A.

The Problem of Executive Pay

For much of the twentieth century, CEOs were paid well relative to
other corporate workers, but according to some business scholars they
were paid on scale suggesting senior “bureaucrats.” 26 Commentators,
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 23-44. See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells,
Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’
Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 847-48 (2011) (noting that “the belief that the
American executive compensation system works well is a distinctly minority position”).
26
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Note How Much You
Pay, But How, HARVARD BUS. REV. (May-June 1990). See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990)
(hypothesizing that market and political forces impose constraints that reduce
performance incentives). However, even Jensen and Murphy have recently recognized
that executive compensation schemes today are seriously flawed. See Kevin J. Murphy &
25
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primarily in business and economics, suggested that contracts should be
optimized to reduce agency cost, thereby justifying and leading to greater
compensation as incentive for superior company performance. 27 In the
1990s, CEO pay experienced an explosive growth and compensation levels
have since remained at high levels relative to worker pay.28 This growth
has level off in the past several years, but what remains after the “big bang”
in executive compensation is a new status quo in which top corporate
executives are routinely paid wages that are several hundred times the
pay of average workers.
Numerous studies have empirically documented the rapid rise of
executive compensation. The following are data from one such study
(salary figures are adjusted to 2011 dollars).29
Year

1965
1973
1978
1989
1995
2000
2007
2011
Annual growth
rate 1973-2011
Annual growth
rate 1989-2012

CEO Compensation Nonsupervisory
(incl. realized
Worker
options)
Compensation

Ratio of CEO-toWorker
Compensation

S&P 500
Index

Dow Jones
Index

38,500
45,800
47,600
44,000
43,600
45,900
48,400
50,300

20.5
22.6
29.7
59.8
127.8
424.4
370.2
241.4

511
451
282
525
737
1,730
1,487
1,268

5,278
3,881
2,411
4,081
6,120
13,006
13,268
11,958

6.7%

0.2%

6.4%

2.8%

3.0%

7.2%

0.6%

6.5%

4.1%

5.0%

791,000
1,033,000
1,413,000
2,631,000
5,570,000
19,482,000
17,919,000
12,141,000

According to this study, the ratio of CEO and worker compensation
has grown in constant dollar terms at a steady pace since 1973 and 1989. In
1973, the ratio of CEO to worker pay was 22.6x, and with a 5.5% real
growth rate the ratio in 2011 was 241.4x. This growth in wage disparity
Michael C. Jensen, CEO Bonus Plans: And How to Fix Them, draft paper dated Nov. 19,
2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935654.
27
See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 26.
28
See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 66-67.
29
Mishel & Sabadish, supra note 1, at 5 tbl. 2. I calculated the annual growth rate
data based on the study’s information. Other studies and sources have shown slightly
different numbers, but all show the same general trend and levels of high ratios of CEO
pay. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 296 n.12, 309 n.88 (providing citations to other
sources and data); Lorsch & Khurana, supra note 9, at 79 (showing ratio of average CEO
pay to average worker pay growing from 44:1 in 1980 to 344:1 in 2007).
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reflects the growth of executive compensation that in the period between
1973 and 2011 has outpaced worker pay by a factor of 33. The growth in
CEO pay has outpaced the growth in the stock market as measured by the
S&P and Dow indices by a factor of two. Executive pay cannot be
explained by marginal productivity gains attributable to actions of senior
executives. 30
Executive pay packages were ordinarily matters of internal corporate
governance and private contracting, a closed world of boards, executives,
and their advisers. As pay packages have exploded in the past several
decades and manipulations of compensation have been exposed,
compensation has become a controversial public issue. Perhaps the most
infamous recent episodes involved the outsized pay package of a former
president of the Walt Disney Company for essentially several months of
ineffective work,31 and the “retention bonuses” for Wall Street investment
bankers even as they were responsible for causing great economic damage
to their firms and the global economy.32 A recent study shows that many
corporations pay their CEOs more than they paid federal income taxes.33
See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 21 (“It strains credulity to think that over the
intervening years CEOs as a group have increased their productivity so much, relative to
the average worker, that a multiple of more than 200 could be justified. Indeed, the
available data on the success of U.S. companies provide no support for such a view.”);
PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334 (“The most convincing proof of the failure of corporate
governance and of the absence of a rational productivity justification for extremely high
executive pay is that when we collect data about individual firms (which we can do for
publicly owned corporations in all the rich countries), it is very difficult to explain the
observed variations in terms of firm performance.”); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 901 (2001) (finding that CEO pay in fact responds as much to a lucky
dollar as to a general dollar” where luck is defined as factors of firm performance that are
outside of the CEO’s control).
31
See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (“In
December 1996, only fourteen months after he commenced employment, [Michael] Ovitz
was terminated without cause, resulting in a severance payout to Ovitz valued at
approximately $130 million.”). This litigation was widely followed in the media. See, e.g.,
Jonathan D. Glater, Big Pay Packages May Fade After Ruling on Ex-President of Disney, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2005).
32
See Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170
Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009). The banks were so embarrassed to called the
payouts “performance bonus” that they were instead called “retention bonus.” STIGLITZ, ,
supra note 5, at 79.
33
Scott Klinger & Sarah Anderson, Fleecing Uncle Sam: A Growing Number of
Corporations Spend More on Executive Compensation than Federal Income Taxes, Institute for
Policy Studies and Center for Effective Government (2014), available at http://www.ipsdc.org/fleecing-uncle-sam/. The report finds that 7 of the top 30 American corporations
30
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There is evidence that even basic corporate financial decisions such as
payout policy have been improperly affected by the effects of retention of
earnings, payment of dividends, and repurchases of stock on the CEO’s
wealth as tied to the compensation package that includes stock and
options.34
Such episodes have come to symbolize conspicuous compensation35
in an era of great economic inequity.36 Although most issues of corporate
governance involving technical and arcane legal rules applied by an
insular group of boards, the corporate bar, and mostly Delaware courts,
the issue of executive compensation has become a public issue.37 Public
consciousness of corporate governance rises from a conspicuous crisis, as
was the case with the governance failures at the turn of the new century
resulting in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the financial crisis of 2008-2009
resulting in the Dodd-Frank Act.
There are two broad camps of thought on executive compensation.
The first is the “optimal contracting” camp, which has argued that
contracting for compensation works well and that the levels of
compensation seen are the product of market pricing for executive

paid their CEOs more than they paid federal income taxes, and that 29 of the 100 highestpaid CEOs received more in pay than their company paid in federal income taxes. Id. at 1.
34
See Philipp Geiler & Luc Renneboog, Executive Remuneration and the Payout
Decision
(2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436343 (discussing the effects of
compensation manipulation on payout policy); Lazonick, supra note 4, at 424-37
(discussing the use of stock buybacks to manipulate compensation). See, e.g., Ryan v.
Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del.Ch. 2007) (involving back dating of stock option grants); Weiss
v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433 (Del.Ch. 2008) (involving “spring-loaded” stock option grants
in which options were granted immediate prior to favorable press announcement).
35
Cf. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899) (observing in the
Gilded Age that the wealthy class demonstrates their status through “conspicuous
consumption”).
36
See PIKETTY, supra note 5; Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequity in
the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (Oct. 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526356; Forget the 1%: It is the
0.01% Who are Really Getting Ahead in America, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2014); Robert
Frank, Another Widening Gap: The Haves vs. the Have-Mores, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014);
Steven Rattner, Inequity, Unbelievably, Gets Worse, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2014).
37
See Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (2013)
(arguing that public scrutiny of corporate governance arises when the ordinary private
ordering of corporate governance fails and that “[d]ecisions about governance move from
Wall Street to Main Street” as a result).
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talent.38 The second is the “board capture” camp, which has argued that
contracting has been undermined by failure of the board to monitor CEO
performance and compensation. The most powerful advocates of this
criticism have been Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.39
The scope of this Article is not to analyze or rehash these arguments.
After a deluge of academic analyses, a general consensus, constituting a
collective wisdom, has been reached that there is a problem with
executive compensation. 40 The optimal contracting camp occupies a
distinctly minority position today.41
This Article assumes the consensus view. It is premised on the view
that the practice of executive compensation has failed, resulting in
economically inefficient and socially inequitable results. Bebchuk and
Fried have powerfully argued that the board and the CEO do not bargain
at arm’s length for compensation, and that CEOs have significant power
and influence over the setting of his or her compensation.42 The observed
result over the past several decades has been a failure of contracting, a
decoupling of pay and performance, and excessive compensation. Due to
managerial power and position, CEOs collect large economic rents.43 In a
See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation
Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160 (2005) (espousing
“optimal contracting theory, which posits that contracts are designed to maximize
shareholder value net of contracting costs and transactions costs”); JONATHAN R. MACEY,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 23 (2008) (“The specific
executive compensation arrangements that we actually observe, however, simply reflect
the result of a bargaining process between shareholders’ elected representatives and
managers.”). Some commentators have even suggested that compensation levels in some
cases may be too low. See Steven Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACADEMY OF
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 5, 6 (2008) (“It is possible that good CEOs are not overpaid,
but underpaid.”). But see James P. Walsh, CEO Compensation and the Responsibilities of the
Business Scholar to Society, 22 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 26, 32-33 (2008)
(arguing that Kaplan based his analysis on a “selective reading of the available
evidence”).
39
BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 23-44, 61-86.
40
See Sorapop Kiatpongsan & Michael I. Norton, How Much (More) Should CEOs
Make? A Universal Desire for More Equal Pay, (forthcoming in Perspectives in Psychological
Science) (showing that most people, regardless of nationality, share similar beliefs on
executive compensation and that their estimates are much lower than the actual
amounts executives make). See also Gretchen Gavett, CEOs Get Paid Too Much, According
to Pretty Much Everyone, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Sept. 23, 2014) (providing a
summary of Kiatpongsan and Norton’s paper).
41
Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 848.
42
BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 23-44, 61-86.
43
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002);
38
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pre-Dodd-Frank era, Bebechuk and Fried argued that shareholders and
the markets have limited influence curbing excessive pay.44 Their criticism
has remained durable even in a post-Dodd-Frank era of shareholder sayon-pay.
However, the premise of this Article goes beyond the Bebchuk and
Fried argument. Bebchuk has been a leading advocate of shareholdercentrism.45 Advocates of shareholder primacy do not connect the role of
executive compensation to the broader problem of economic inequity.
Their concern is the maximization of shareholder wealth. Presumably
much of the din of the “board capture” camp would go silent if the
current compensation levels were strongly connected to shareholder
wealth. The connection between executive pay and income inequity
should be made because this aspect of corporate governance imposes
broad externalities beyond senior executives and shareholders. 46 The
problem of executive compensation is not just an issue of allocating
wealth between senior executives and shareholders. There is a larger
question of social equity: that is, the distribution of the gains resulting in
excessively large allocations to a small handful of senior executives even
though production in a corporation is always a collective endeavor among
many factors of production, including employees. Distribution and
efficiency are connected.47
Excessive compensation poses political and economic questions
beyond the immediate microeconomic concerns of agency cost and
monitoring and their impact on shareholder value. With that said,
shareholder primacy and social equity may not be binary choices. The
most efficient outcomes for shareholders may be lower compensation
STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 65 (“One of the interpretations of these data is that in effect,
during the periods when wages grew so much slower than productivity, corporate
managers seized a larger share of the ‘rents’ associated with corporations.”). Economic
rent is derived “from the strategic advantage that management possesses in the
distribution of the returns to monopoly power.” Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial
Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032, 1035 (1963).
44
BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 45-58.
45
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Francise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833
(2005).
46
See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 66-67; PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334.
47
See Amartya Sen, Does Business Ethics Make Economic Sense?, 3 BUS. ETHICS
QUARTERLY 45 (1993) (arguing that distribution can affect production). On the
macroeconomic level, distribution can also affect efficiency. Based on increased inequity
of wealth distribution, Standard & Poor’s has lowered the growth forecast of the US
economy. Supra note 8.
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levels for senior executives on the whole. 48 This outcome would suit
shareholders and employees alike and would tend to make income and
wealth distributions more equitable across the corporation and society
since shareholders hold wealth across a much broader spectrum of society
than the class of senior executives. Income inequity is a major facet of the
controversy over executive compensation even though it is not a priority
of the shareholder-centric “board capture” school of thought. This Article
acknowledges the connection between corporate governance and income
inequity.
B.

Limits of Delaware Corporation Law

When discussing a failure of an aspect of corporate governance, some
may consider the font of reform to lie in state corporation law. 49 This
thought is more hopeful than real.50 There are impediments to any serious
reform through state corporation law.
First is the problem of politics and money. Delaware reigns supreme
in corporation law, particularly for public corporations where the problem
of compensation is most acute.51 Delaware law is regarded as a kind of a
quasi-national corporation law, and its judiciary enjoys its well-earned
reputation as preeminent corporate jurists. This expertise is a competitive
advantage for the state and generates significant revenue. 52 Since
meaningful reform of compensation would most likely result in systemic
decrease in executive compensation, any semblance of real reform in
Delaware would run the real risk of a “compensation run” to other
jurisdictions by those holding the managerial power to make these
decisions. Management will want to avoid jurisdictions that will actively
scrutinize the grant of compensation. There would be literally millions of
See BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2 (criticizing the aggregate dollar values of
compensation).
49
See, e.g., Thomas & Wells, supra note 25 (focusing on the fiduciary duty of officers
in the contracting process); Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’
Fiduciary Duties, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2013) (focusing on negative say-on-pay votes as a
basis for fiduciary obligations of boards).
50
See BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 45-46 (arguing that “judicial review has
failed to impose any meaningful constraints on executive pay”)
51
See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (noting that over half of all public companies
that incorporate in the United States incorporate in Delaware).
52
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125 (2009)
(discussing Delaware’s revenue from corporation law); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Poltics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) (same).
48
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reasons to forsake Delaware. Nothing is more immediately in the selfinterest of any worker than compensation. Knowing this, the Delaware
legislature and courts will not take action that would seriously
compromise the state’s franchise.53
With this perspective in mind, Delaware courts have applied the
traditional doctrines of fiduciary duty, business judgment rule, and
corporate waste to review compensation cases. This framework gives a
board virtually unfettered discretion to award whatever compensation it
decides54 absent culpable conduct arising from disloyalty, bad faith, bad
process, faulty disclosure, waste, or outright fraud.55 As long as a board
makes an informed decision in good faith and shareholders were not
deceived, the decision would be effectively bulletproof. Based on this legal
framework, derivative suits based on negative shareholder say-on-pay
votes have been predictably dismissed in the vast majority of cases.56
In the past three decades as executive compensation has exploded
and as the courts have been forced to decide bad cases (on the facts) like
the Disney litigation57, what have courts done about the problem? No new
doctrines have been developed to address the problem.58 Although there
have been some historical instances in which courts have threatened
higher scrutiny, they have returned to managerial deference as public
dissatisfaction subsided. 59 As commentators have noted, shareholders
On the occasion when the Delaware courts took action that was deemed
significantly against the interests of corporate management, the legislature took
immediate action to legislatively overrule the court. Of course, this the famous episode of
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and the subsequent enactment of Section
102(b)(7) exculpation provision. See Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity:
Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice during a National Crisis, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 661, 682-83 (2010).
54
See, e.g., Zucker v. Andreessen, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del.Ch. 2012) (upholding
severance package of $40 million to a fired executive); In re Walt Disney Derivative
Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (upholding compensation of $130 million to a fired
executive).
55
State corporation law is most effective as a check on executive compensation
when there has been fraud or major defects in disclosure. See, e.g., Weiss v. Swanson, 948
A.2d 433 (Del.Ch. 2008) (holding that the plaintiff sufficient pleaded faulty disclosure and
corporate waste in relation to stock option manipulation); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341
(Del.Ch. 2007) (same).
56
See Fairfax, supra note 49, at 23-25 (describing the current state of derivative
litigation).
57
In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
58
See generally Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 865-80 (providing a history of case
law on executive compensation).
59
Id. at 879.
53
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succeeded in some cases “at some stage of the litigation process.”60 This
qualifier is important because what really matters for changing behavior
and outcomes is liability, and the threat of liability is not really credible
unless there is a real possibility of liability based on the theory of
excessive compensation.61 There has been no case where a board struck
down a compensation decision based on excessive amount.62
From the framework of longstanding doctrine, courts are right to shy
away from meddling in the substantive terms of the employment contract
between the corporation and the CEO, if the contract is the product of
actual arms-length bargaining. Judges substantially influencing specific
contract terms such as the amount of compensation would be frowned
upon. Courts can certainly apply their own judgment on the matter,63 but
this contravenes long-existing pillars of corporation law of giving boards
deference when they acted in an informed and good faith basis. 64 The
board has the authority to decide the business and affairs of the
corporation to the board. 65 This authority necessitates the business
judgment rule, which is a socially useful rule limiting the liability for
officers and directors.66 Good, bad, or ugly—corporate governance under
current standards is stuck with the decisions of boards.67

Id. at 879-80.
See Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1154 (2013) (“The ultimate source of the expressive value of
judicial opinions is derived solely from the power to assess liability (i.e., a consultant in a
black robe is still just a consultant).”).
62
“[Courts] have been hampered, at least in part, by the waste doctrine and its
inherent weaknesses, and by lack of any alternative, practicable approach to scrutinizing
compensation.” Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 880. When board action fits within
traditional theories of misconduct, such as faulty disclosure or waste, courts have acted in
the compensation arena. See supra note 55 & infra note 80.
63
Courts are not incompetent as an intellectual incapability to comprehend and
analyze business judgments. See Rhee, supra note 61, at 1152 (“Despite frequent assertions,
scholars have been rightfully skeptical of the argument that courts lack the technical
competence to review business decisions.”).
64
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the business
judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors . . .
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company”). See also Rhee, supra note 61, at 1140 (noting
that rules limiting liability of shareholders and directors are two pillars of corporate law).
65
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).
66
See Rhee, supra note 63.
67
See In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.Ch.
1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision
60
61
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Thinking within the current corporate law framework, commentators
have suggested that a potential check on self-interested negotiation for
compensation could be the fiduciary duty of corporate officers.68 There are
reasons to be less sanguine about the efficacy of this route to reform. As a
contracting counterparty to the corporation, officers are entitled to pursue
their self-interested economic goals. Fiduciary duty cannot go so far as to
suggest that employees and agents should be charities to the firm or that
they have a duty to ignore their primary economic interest of vigorously
bargaining their wage or stake.69 Even before the recent recognition of an
officer’s fiduciary duty in Delaware, the assumption has been that officers
were fiduciaries, and so the rise in executive compensation has occurred
with this understanding. Public companies are required to have
independent board members in their compensation committees. 70
Accordingly, board independence would achieve a largely similar
outcome as officer contracting under the halo of fiduciary duty.
Courts are not incapable of developing new doctrines to address new
business climates on fairly short notice. Delaware courts rapidly
developed new doctrines to confront the new realities of the takeover and
leveraged buyout era of the 1980s and 1990s.71 In executive compensation,
however, there have been no similar judicial innovations to design a
different review system tailored to the specific problem at hand.72 This has
not been for lack of good test cases that could have served as vehicles for
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or
‘irrational’, provides no ground for director liability.”).
68
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 25 (relying on Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695,
708-09 (Del. 2009)).
69
Analogously, in partnership law, partners owe fiduciary duty that is said to be
“[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). But partnership law makes clear that a partner’s
conduct does not violate fiduciary duty “merely because the partner’s conduct furthers
the partner’s own interest.” Revised Uniform Partnership Law § 404(e).
70
Dodd-Frank Act § 952(a). See New York Stock Exchange Listing Rule 303A.05(a)
(“Listed companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely of
independent directors.”).
71
See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 828
(Del. 1993) (applying an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny in the sale of a company);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(determining the fiduciary duty in the context of a cash buyout); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1985) (determining the scrutiny to be applied in the context
of management’s defensive measures in a takeover situation).
72
Some commentators have proposed modifications to Delaware’s laws of
fiduciary duty and judicial review. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 25; Fairfax, supra note
49.
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judicial action. For example, the Delaware court openly acknowledged
that the circumstance in Disney did not display a model of corporate
governance;73 yet bad facts were insufficient to construct a new doctrine
specific to governance failure in compensation.
Doctrinal innovations are possible, and the lack of them is a product
of choice. As a state supreme court, the Delaware Supreme Court could
set forth a bright-line rule on presumption of validity such as
compensation that is less than 100:1 ratio between the CEO and the lowest
paid employee and that compensation levels beyond that would be
scrutinized under a higher standard, for example, entire fairness standard
requiring scrutiny of the substance of the business decision.74 Or consider
the possibility of announcing an intermediate scrutiny for severance pay
or golden parachutes based on a multifactor reasonableness standard,
such as the benefit to the corporation, the corporation’s ability to attract
executive talent, the length of tenure, the quality of past service, and other
relevant facts. Obviously, I am not proposing these rules in this Article.
Instead, they are not absurd examples offered simply suggest the potential
of a more thoughtful common law process in which the rule of law is
malleable to the particular social problem at hand.75
The point is that if Delaware wanted to do something about the
problem, it could have done so and it has had recurring opportunities.
One need not be a Delaware naysayer76 to believe that Delaware courts,
See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 32 (Del. 2006) (observing
that the board’s “decision-making process fell short of best practices”).
74
Such bright-line standards are more typically found in the legislative process, but
there are prominent examples from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence of judicially set
quantitative limits. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today.”); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)
(“Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however,
that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
75
Much of Delaware corporation law, though statute originated, is developed
through the common law process. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism
and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1610 (2005) (“Delaware
corporate law may be the last vestige of the 19th century common law style in America.”);
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law
and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) (“Delaware's common law process, which places case law at the
forefront of corporate law, is the functional equivalent of judicial legislation.”).
76
See William L. Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974). The question of whether corporate law is engaged in a “race to the
bottom” or a “race to the top” has spawned a vigorous debate. Compare id. at 666
73
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protecting parochial state interests, are simply not inclined to exercise its
judicial power to reform executive compensation on a national level in a
way that would harm the prestige and economics of the state’s
corporation law franchise.
Without state legislative mandate, the erection of new doctrinal
frameworks to address executive compensation would be a bridge too far
for the corporate bench.77 Courts would have to go outside the comfort
zone and habits of familiar doctrines. As the Delaware chancery court
stated, “[t]he decision as to how much compensation is appropriate to
retain and incentivize employees, both individually and in the aggregate,
is a core function of a board of directors exercising its business
judgment.” 78 State corporation law is designed to give maximum
authority and discretion to informed, non-bad faith decisions on the
amount of the pay.79 Delaware is not a serious solution to the problem of
excessive pay. 80 This conclusion is an unremarkable observation of the
(advancing the “race to the bottom” argument), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255-56 (1977),
and Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 127, 128-30 (1982) (advancing the “race to the top” argument).
77
In the past, Delaware courts have created new doctrines, including different
standards of review, to address different kinds of problems in corporation law including
the takeover arena. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(providing an intermediate, two-part standard to review a board’s defensive action
against a hostile acquirer). See also William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Function Over Form: A Reassessment of the Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law,
56 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001). However, the jurisprudence on compensation has shown little
signs that Delaware courts were going take a leading role in the area of compensation by
departing from the traditional fiduciary duty, business judgment rule, and waste
framework.
78
In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104
(Del.Ch. 2011).
79
See Lisa R. Stark, Delaware Insider: Stockholders Have a “Say on Pay” in Delaware?
Lessons from Recent Executive Compensation Decisions, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 2012)
(“Stockholders seeking to challenge compensation decisions made by disinterested and
informed directors have an uphill battle in Delaware.”).
80
There are the occasional rulings that seem to acknowledge the problem of
executive compensation. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 879-80. See, e.g., In re
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.Ch. 2009) (ruling that
the plaintiff’s claim for waste in the grant of Citigroup’s former CEO could not be
dismissed at the pleading stage). However, these cases work within the traditional
framework of corporate waste, which is an exceedingly difficult standard to meet.
Irrationality is “the outer limit of the business judgment rule” and “the functional
equivalent of the waste test.” Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). Waste occurs
“only in the rare, ‘unconscionable case”’ where a board irrationally squanders corporate
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current limits of state corporation law, the contours of which are shaped
by corporation law’s unique aspects of the politics of revenue-generative
lawmaking business, the legitimacy of longstanding doctrinal foundation,
and judicial weighing when stare decisis confronts new social problems.
C.

Say-On-Pay and the Dodd-Frank Act

Regulation of compensation must be prescribed by legislation. This
practical understanding gave rise to the say-on-pay phenomenon. Say-onpay is a fairly new concept.81 The idea originated in the U.K. where sayon-pay was enacted in 2002.82 Other countries with advanced economies
soon followed. Australia and the Netherlands enacted laws in 2004,
Sweden in 2006, and Norway in 2007.83 The rapid adoption of say-on-pay
in other advanced economies indicates a global perception of a problem in
executive compensation.
In the U.S., nascent efforts to influence the board’s discretion in
compensation came in the form of shareholder proxy proposals. The first
shareholder say-on-pay proxy proposals were submitted under Rule 14a-8
in 2006. 84 By 2009, say-on-pay proposals were the largest category of
shareholder proxy proposals and regularly achieved majority shareholder
support. 85 A handful of companies even voluntarily instituted say-onpay.86 But these efforts were sporadic, depending on shareholder initiative
in proxy proposals.
Say-on-pay first became a federal regulatory requirement in 2008 and
2009, when financial firms receiving TARP funds were required to
institute shareholder say-on-pay.87 During this time, another high profile
executive compensation episode captured the public’s attention. While the
assets. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006). As such, the
exception has been described as “theoretical.” Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d
1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996).
81
For a history, see Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1217-36.
82
Id. at 1226.
83
Id. at 1227. See generally Jan Lieder & Philipp Fischer, The Say-on-Pay Movement—
Evidence from a Comparative Perspective, 8 EUROPEAN COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 376 (2011)
(discussing say-on-pay in Europe).
84
Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1217.
85
Id. at 1217-18.
86
Id. at 1218.
87
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e); American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 111(e), 123 Stat. 115, 519.
About 280 financial firms that received TARP funds were required to hold say-on-pay
votes. Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1223.
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financial markets were collapsing and the American public was suffering
through the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, 88 Wall
Street investment bankers and executives received enormous “retention”
bonuses.89 The decoupling of pay and performance on Wall Street was
absolute and complete in this case. Since state laws were insufficient to
address these kinds of problems, the federal government intervened in
this area of corporate governance.90
With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the mandate of say-onpay was extended broadly to all U.S. public companies. 91 The statute
requires that at least every 3 years, the company must allow a shareholder
vote to approve executive compensation packages. 92 It also mandates
votes on the frequency of the vote (whether taken every 1, 2 or 3 years)
and golden parachute payments in a merger or acquisition.93 In spite of
management recommendations for triennial votes, shareholders of most
companies have voted to hold say-on-pay votes annually.94 Shareholder
vote applies to the compensation packages of the top five executive
officers named in the proxy compensation disclosure. 95 The vote is a
straight “for” or “against” the overall compensation package and does not
provide for line item voting on various aspects of the compensation
package.96 The vote is advisory and not binding on the board.97 Say-onpay does not create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of the
board or create any additional fiduciary duties.98 The authority to approve
compensation packages rests squarely with the board.

See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011).
89
See Andrews & Baker, supra note 32.
90
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that
federal government intervenes in corporate governance when it perceives failures or
inadequacies in state corporation laws). See also Mark J. Roe, A Spatial Representation of
Delaware-Washington Interaction in Corporate Lawmaking, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 553
(2012).
91
Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1218.
92
Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1)). The disclosure of
executive compensation is provided in 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
93
Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(2), (b)).
94
Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1249.
95
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) .
96
Id.
97
Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)).
98
Id.
88
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The Dodd-Frank Act also strengthened the board’s independence on
compensation decisions. Public companies must have independent board
members on its compensation committee. 99 Relevant factors in
determining independence are the source of compensation of a director,
and whether a director is affiliated with the issuer or its affiliates.100
The Dodd-Frank Act also recognizes the political and socio-economic
dimensions of relative pay and income inequality. It requires disclosure of
the median of the annual total compensation of all employees (not
including the CEO), the annual total compensation of the CEO, and the
ratio of the two figures. 101 Since CEO pay is already required to be
disclosed, the important disclosure is the median employee pay. The ratio
succinctly communicates pay differential. 102 The disclosure would be
required in any annual report, proxy or information statement, or
registration statement that requires executive compensation disclosure.103
The wage ratio disclosure is not a direct benefit to shareholders, who are
not so concerned with the relative pay levels. It is a legislative nod to the
concerns of employees and the public.
Several salutary benefits of the pay ratio disclosure may be achieved.
Shaming may temper the most pecuniary appetites, though there is the
distinct possibility that millions of more dollars may ultimately outweigh
the cost of these negative feelings. Public disclosure and pressure may also
be felt. Although CEOs are public figures, many would prefer to avoid
notoriety in the eyes of the public. An eye-catching disparity in pay may
depress employee morale and elicit disapproval, which are relevant to the
production function. These combined effects may influence pay practices
at the outer margins. The pay ratio disclosure is a small step toward
greater equity in compensation.

See supra note 70.
Dodd-Frank Act § 952. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manuel §
303A.02(a)(ii) (providing the test of independence as “all factors specifically relevant to
determining whether a director has a relationship to the listed company which is material
to that director's ability to be independent from management in connection with the
duties of a compensation committee member”).
101
Dodd-Frank Act § 953(b) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78l).
102
Thus, for example, if the CEO is paid $15 million and the medium employee
income is $50,000, the required disclosure of the ratio would be 300:1.
103
The SEC recently issued proposed rules on implementing Section 953(b). Pay
Ratio Disclosure, Proposed Rule, Release Nos. 33-9452, File No. S7-07-13, 17 C.F.R. Parts
229 and 249.
99

100
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D.

Voting Results and Limits of Shareholder Monitoring

Since shareholder say-on-pay is fairly new in the U.S., only
preliminary data are available on outcomes and their effects. Two
informative empirical studies of the first year of Dodd-Frank’s mandate
have been conducted. 104 The results show that shareholder say-on-pay
may be a limited monitoring device.
Shareholders strongly supported management resolutions on pay.105
Votes in favor averaged 91.2% for all companies.106 Only 37 companies
failed to receive majority support.107 These negative votes stemmed from
shareholder discontent arising from a perceived disconnect between pay
and company performance. 108 Overall, shareholder votes were highly
correlated with share price returns and the amount of CEO pay. 109
Unremarkably, shareholders favored high share returns and low CEO pay,
and disliked low share returns and high pay. 110 Shareholders did not
necessarily follow the recommendations of Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), a proxy advisory firm. 111 While all 37 negative votes
followed the negative recommendations of ISS, the firm recommended
negative votes for 285 companies, 13% of the companies it reviewed.112

See Thomas et al. (2013), supra note 11; Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11.
In the 2011 proxy season, about 2,220 U.S. public companies held shareholder
votes on executive compensation. Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1248.
106
Id. at 1249. Thomas et al. report similar results from other empirical studies. See
Michael Littenberg, Farzad Damania & Justin Neidig, A Closer Look at Negative Say-on-Pay
Votes During the 2011 Proxy Season, DIRECTOR NOTES (Conference Bd.), July 2011, at 2
(noting that only 36 companies, or 1.6%, of 2,225 companies in the Russell 3000 that held
votes rejected management compensation resolutions). About 71% of companies received
more than 90% shareholder vote, 23% received 70-90% vote, and 6% received 50-70% vote.
Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1250.
107
Id. at 1251.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1249.
110
Id.
111
See http://www.issgovernance.com/. It provides proxy services to shareholders
for a fee, and provides proxy voting recommendations.
112
Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1255. However, ISS still had some
influence. In another study, Thomas, Palmiter and Cotter report that when ISS
recommended “for” votes, shareholders voted in favor on average 92.6% with no
proposals being voted down. When ISS recommended “against” votes, shareholders
voted in favor 64.4%, with 31 failed votes out of 173 “against” recommendations. Thomas
et al. (2013), supra note 11, at 983.
104
105
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In light of the mostly positive votes, “the voting gesture mandated by
law might have been mostly empty.”113 However, the legal right to a voice
on the issue may have changed the dynamics of the dialogue between
shareholders and management.114 In a few cases, management has been
responsive to some aspects of shareholder concern. 115 These marginal
effects of shareholder voting and generally the limit of shareholder
efficacy in monitoring are not surprising. Commentators have previously
predicted that say-on-pay will be ineffective because shareholders will not
engage in individualized analysis and monitoring of executive
compensation. 116 Preliminary data seem to support, in the main, these
earlier critiques.
The problem with shareholder say-on-pay is the well-recognized
observation of rational shareholder apathy.117 “Often the aggregate cost to
shareholders of informing themselves of potential corporate actions,
independently assessing the wisdom of such actions, and casting their
votes will greatly exceed the expected or actual benefits garnered from
informed voting.”118 Apathy toward monitoring is rational from a costbenefit perspective. The problem is one of collective action. 119 It is
exacerbated when diffused shareholders hold diversified portfolios of
many investments,120 and when the turnover on the typical investment is
relatively short even for longterm shareholders. 121 The profile of the
Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1265.
Id. See Thomas et al. (2013), supra note 11, at 1002-10 (providing four case studies
of the dialogue between shareholders and management resulting from shareholder votes
on executive compensation).
115
See Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1265; Thomas et al. (2013), supra note 11,
at 1002-10. Some empirical studies have suggested that say-on-pay has not changed the
amount of compensation, but instead it changed the mix of cash and incentive pay. See
Natasha Burns & Kristina Minnick, Does Say-on-Pay Matter? Evidence from Say-on-Pay
Proposals in the United States, 48 FIN. REV. 233 (2013).
116
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the
Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 341 (2009) (noting that in the U.K.
shareholders approved compensation packages in many thousands of votes with only
eight negative votes over a six-year period).
117
See CLARK, supra note 12, at 390-400 (discussing the problem of the rationally
apathetic shareholder).
118
Id. at 390-91.
119
Id. at 391-92.
120
See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
121
See Mark Roe, Are Stock Markets Really Becoming Really Becoming More Short Term?,
PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 21, 2013) (suggesting that the average hold period for longterm
investors like Fidelity and Vanguard was 1.5 years in 2010; citing Martijn Cremers, Ankur
Pareek,
and
Zacharius
Saunter,
Stock
Duration
and
Misvaluation,
113
114
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shareholder with most incentive to monitor and to engage actively in
corporate governance is a longterm, activist, or undiversified shareholder,
and while such shareholders exist they are not ubiquitous in a modern,
liquid equity market in which diversification is said to be a good thing.122
Lastly, as the efficient market hypothesis suggests, many shareholders
rely on market prices to incorporate all public information, which further
diminishes the incentive to monitor investments at the individual holding
level.123
Evidence in the voting patterns in the U.K. and the U.S. support this
conventional view of shareholder apathy. 124 Most shareholders most of
the time vote in favor of management’s compensation. For a company that
has not disappointed shareholders with lower returns or incited their
discontent with excessively high executive compensation for poor
performance, 125 the default vote would likely be in favor of the
compensation package. Even when a proxy advisory firm issues a
negative recommendation, shareholders mostly disregard the advice.126
A contrary interpretation of the preliminary data could be that
shareholders are fully engaged in monitoring compensation, and in the
vast majority of cases they voted in favor of compensation packages after
informed consideration. But advancing these conclusions would be
difficult. Empirical data on voting outcomes do not reveal the thought
processes of the many thousands of voting shareholders. One wonders
whether shareholders examined the record and made individualized

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190437),
available
at
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/has-short-termism-in-stock-marketsincreased-by-mark-roe.
122
See Markowitz, supra note 120, at 77 (showing that diversification was a
normatively good investment strategy).
123
See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 327 (11th ed. 2014) (“The evidence of efficient markets has
convinced many professional and individual investors to give up pursuit of superior
performance. They simply ‘buy the index,’ which maximizes diversification and cuts
costs to the bone.”). See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398 (2014).
124
See KYM MAREE SHEEHAN, THE REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: GREED,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAY ON PAY 145-59 (2012) (discussing the limited of institutional
investors as effective monitors of executive pay).
125
See Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1249 (reporting that “low returns and
high CEO pay result[ed] in lower say-on-pay support”).
126
See id. at 1265 (“ISS may be less influential than commonly thought on this type
of proposal.”).
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informed decisions for companies in their diversified portfolios.127 Also,
shareholders are limited to market information, primarily share price
returns and publicly disclosed financial results, explaining the
relationship between the level of voting support and share price. The
problem with shareholder monitoring is well founded.128
The conclusion inferred from mostly positive votes is important. A
hypothesis of informed decisionmaking would be far reaching. Since
compensation levels have not come down due to say-on-pay, the
implications would be that there has not been a real problem of executive
compensation at all, and that informed shareholders agree with most pay
packages. The many critiques are simply much ado about nothing since
they do not reflect the concerns of most shareholders. However, this
contrary interpretation of data has not been demonstrated to be true, and
scholars have not advanced it.
The problem of the rationally apathetic shareholder is significant in
shareholder say-on-pay. Even institutional shareholders are not immune
because as highly diversified, active traders in a liquid equity market, the
cost-benefit analysis is acute. Although proxy advisers could ameliorate
the collective action problem, 129 the preliminary empirical evidence
suggests that this is not the case.130 If say-on-pay is limited in its efficacy, it
reflects the fact that shareholders are limited in their capability to
effectively monitor. Another monitor can be more effective or can
complement the efforts of shareholders if the cost of monitoring is low
and the incentive to monitor is higher.
II. EMPLOYEE SAY-ON-PAY
A.

The Proposal

See Michael Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1313 (2013) (“At
least for such public companies with dispersed ownership, it is highly unlikely that the
multiplicity of shareholders will remain well informed about the company's affairs and
then achieve collective agreement on the best course of action for their company.”).
128
See Adams, supra note 12, at 422 (noting that “shareholders have historically been
of little importance in monitoring corporate conduct” due to “the collective action
problem”).
129
See Gordon, supra note 116, at 351-52.
130
See Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1213 (noting that “the net effect of a
negative ISS recommendation on the overall shareholder vote is relatively small at most
companies”).
127
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This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay, which
would mirror the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate of shareholder say-on-pay.
At least once every 3 years, a public U.S. corporation should hold an
employee vote to approve the compensation of top executives.131 Unison
of voting between shareholders and employees is not required, as long as
employees have periodic opportunities to vote and convey information to
the board. However, it would be ideal if shareholder and employee vote
in tandem. Most shareholder votes occur annually, and so employee votes
should be the same.
Shareholder say-on-pay would be an advisory vote and not binding
on the board.132 The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that the shareholder vote
cannot be construed: “(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board
of directors; (2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of
such issuer or board of directors; (3) to create or imply any additional
fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of directors.” 133 These
requirements should also apply to employee say-on-pay. The board has
the ultimate authority to set compensation.
Unlike shareholder say-on-pay, employee vote could be conditioned
on a wage ratio trigger. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the disclosure of the
wage ratio between the CEO and employees. 134 Employee say-on-pay
could be structured to trigger upon exceeding a certain level of wage ratio.
There is an efficiency consideration. Say-on-pay is designed to police
excessive compensation. A certain level of wage ratio could be deemed to
be presumptively not excessive when compared to the baseline of the
median employee pay, and thus employee say-on-pay could be structured
to trigger at a certain level. For example, if the compensation ratio is
20:1—a quaint level in light of the modern trend in compensation—one
would question whether a say-on-pay vote by either shareholders or
employees is really necessary.
Certain intuitions can guide us. A trigger of 20:1 would most likely
be deemed too low, and would take executive compensation back to the
1960s and 1970s.135 A trigger of 100:1 would probably be too high because
Cf. Dodd-Frank Act § 951.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. The SEC has announced proposed rules on wage ratio disclosure. Pay Ratio
Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. Parts 229 and 249 (Release Nos. 33-9452; 34-70443; File No. S7-07-13).
135
To be clear, the suggestion that it is “too low” refers to the necessary political
compromises that have to take place to enact legislation. By way of comparison, the
Japanese ratio of CEO to average employee pay is approximately 16:1. Jason Clenfield, In
131
132
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this level is in the neighborhood of current levels that have caused public
and political rebuke.136 Some compromise in the range between 50:1 to
100:1 seems about right. This range permits high salary, but one suspects
that neither employees nor the public would be so outraged by this sort of
level. Any rent extraction that may occur would be fairly marginal, and
properly deemed insignificant in light of the cost of monitoring.137
A concrete example illustrated the point. Suppose the median
employee pay at a corporation is $50,000.138 At a trigger range of 75:1,
CEO pay could be $3.75 million without triggering employee say-on-pay.
Based on current pay levels of CEOs today, the majority of public
companies, most of which are by definition small cap and midcap
companies, may not be required to hold employee votes.139 Since the size
of CEO pay is highly correlated to the size of the corporation, 140 the
compensation packages for the largest companies would surely be subject
to employee say-on-pay.141
Parenthetically, the idea of a wage trigger can be applied as to the
mandate of shareholder say-on-pay as a tweak of the Dodd-Frank reform.
Such votes would be unnecessary if the wage ratio between the CEO and
employees does not exceed a certain level. This reform of say-on-pay
could have efficiency benefits. One strongly suspects that in light of the
correlation between firm size and pay, a significant portion of smaller
Japan, Underpaid—and Loving It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 1, 2010), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186014341924.htm.
136
See supra note 29 and accompanying table.
137
See Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, at 24 (“Moreover,
‘awarding’ pay by allowing managers to extract some rents can be optimal if monitoring
is
costly.”),
working
paper
available
at
http://web.mit.edu/frydman/www/COMP%20SURVEY%2008-02-10.pdf.
138
See id. (providing average nonsupervisory worker compensation). Some
companies pay their employees high compensation. See, e.g., Brett Philbin, Average
Goldman Pay: $399,506, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2013) (noting the average pay at Goldman
Sachs in 2012); Gus Lubin, Google Has the Highest Average Salaries in the Tech Industry:
$141,000, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 10, 2011) (noting the average pay at Google in 2010).
139
In 2012, the median total realized compensation of CEOs in the Russell 2000 was
$1.8 million. Greg Ruel, CEO Pay Survey: Stock Option Profits Continue to Pave CEOs’ Path
to the Bank, GMI RATINGS at 5 (2013) (based on a sample size of 1349 companies).
140
See id at 4 (showing significant pay differences among CEOs in the S&P
Smallcaps, Midcaps, and 500 indices, with 2012 median total realized compensations of
$2.4 million, $4.9 million, and $11.9 million, respectively).
141
See id. at 4 (showing that median total realized compensation of $11.9 million in
2012 for CEOs of the Fortune 500 companies); Gretchen Morgenson, The Unstoppable
Climb in C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013) (noting that the top 100 CEOs were paid a
median compensation of $14 million in 2012).
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companies,142 perhaps even a majority, would be exempt from holding
say-on-pay votes with a reasonable trigger, and that a great majority of
larger companies would still be subject to shareholder vote. One hastens
to add that if the idea is appealing in the abstract, the difficulty in practice
would be to identify the trigger level. A trigger in the range between 50:1
to 100:1 seems plausible as a political compromise.
B.

Weighed Voting

Implementing a voting scheme requires careful weighing of fairness
and efficiency considerations. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of shareholder
democracy, 143 a corporation is not a platonic political entity. 144 It is an
economic organization. In corporate governance, there is no liberty
interest in the right to governance. The political principles of universal
suffrage and “one person, one vote”145 do not apply for obvious reasons.
Shareholders voting is based on shares held,146 and shareholder classes of
The SEC provided an exemption from say-on-pay to smaller companies with less
than $75 million in public float until January 20, 2013. Shareholder Approval of Executive
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011).
Smaller reporting companies must now hold say-on-pay votes.
143
Shareholder democracy is frequently used as short-hand for shareholder
participation through voting in corporate governance. See Hoschett v. TSI Intern.
Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del.Ch. 1996) (Allen, Ch.) (noting that voting and
deliberation aspects of shareholders’ annual meeting resembles democratic discourse);
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.Sup. 1971) (referring to the
principle of shareholder voting as “corporate democracy”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 842-43 (2005) (suggesting that
shareholder democracy will enhance shareholder value). See also Lisa M. Fairfax, Making
the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 55 (2008) (suggesting a
link between shareholder democracy and corporate and executive accountability).
144
See Hoschett v. TSI Intern. Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del.Ch. 1996) (Allen,
Ch.) (noting that “the model of democratic forms should not too strictly be applied to the
economic institution of a business corporation (where for instance votes are weighted by
the size of the voter's investment)”). See also Tom C.W. Lin, 47 UC DAVID L. REV. 1351,
1399 (2014) (suggesting that “[c]orporations are not democratic nation-states” and that
wholesale attempts to “democratize” them can cause serious harms).
145
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
146
See CLARK, supra note 12, at 390 (“We could argue further that voting rights
should be proportional to one’s share of the residual interest in the firm.”). More
generally, inequality and inequity are separate concepts in corporation law. See
Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 886 (Del. 2002) (noting that “equity and equality
are not synonymous concepts in the Delaware General Corporation Law”); Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (“It is well established in our jurisprudence
that stockholders need not always be treated equally for all purposes.”).
142
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unequal rights are permissible.147 Voting rights in corporations serve an
economic purpose. 148 Unlike shareholders, employees and creditors
typically do not vote on important matters such as director and
fundamental transactions. 149 These observations raise a fundamental
question of how the voting scheme should be conceived.
Voting in corporations is not based on egalitarian principles. This
Article proposes that every employee should have a vote, but that vote
allocation should be unequal. Vote allocation should be a function of the
potential effectiveness of different classes of employees as monitors of
executive performance.
Even the lowest ranking employee of a large public company may
have some sense of how the company is doing. But their understanding of
CEO performance would not compare to the senior manager of a business
unit. Consider a low level worker at a large corporation with a market
capitalization of $10 billion. How will the lowest rank and file employee,
who may earn $25,000 per year, feel about the CEO earning $10 million, a
ratio of 400:1? Would a visceral emotional reaction to the income disparity
be relevant? These kinds of anticipated personal reactions at the firm level
should not be factors in determining executive compensation.
Employee say-on-pay must principally serve a monitoring role. 150
This function requires informed voting, which communicates relevant
information to the board. Weighed voting is required. The allocation of
voting rights should be based on employee titles, functions and job
descriptions. In rational corporate hierarchies, the quantum and quality of
information held is fairly correlated to position in the corporate hierarchy.
Companies should have discretion to allocate votes, subject to a
prohibition against gaming. Gaming can be achieved by allocating most
voting power to the highest level of executive management since this layer
would most favor executive pay proposals. There is a balance between
calibrated voting and gamed outcomes. This balance can be achieved
either through some qualitative standards, or through bright-line
See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 151(a) (permitting different preference rights and classes
of stock). Companies like Google, Berkshire Hathaway, Alibaba, and Ford Motor have
different classes of common stock with different voting rights.
148
See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1996) (explaining the importance of voting rights of equity capital).
149
Cf. DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 221 (permitting debt instruments to have voting rights).
Absent unusual circumstances, however, it would be odd for debt instruments to have
voting rights. Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
150
See Adams, supra note 12, at 442 (noting that full-circle evaluations promote
“efficiency and profitability”).
147
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quantitative rules.151 For example, a proportion that allocates 20% of the
vote to the non-managerial rank and file workforce might not be an
unreasonable mix. This allotment is a significant but nevertheless minority
voting power. The visceral reaction of the average employee against a
relatively high CEO pay, if that is the fear, would not overwhelm the
voting outcome. At the same time, knowing what average employees
think about their CEO’s pay is still relevant information for the board.
Issues like morale, happiness, job satisfaction, commitment to the firm,
social cohesion, and sense of common undertaking (if not common lot);
and they are relevant factors in the corporation’s production function. A
small but meaningful allocation serves an information function. Each
company should be allowed to calibrate voting such that there can be
meaningful participation.
The class of voters with the greatest individual voting power should
be the managerial ranks below the highest executive level subject to SEC
compensation reporting requirements. This is a significant class of senior
executives who are managers of large business units or functions. They
possess the best information on the performance of the CEO and the
company’s prospects, but they are most likely to be biased in favor of the
CEO. These competing tensions balance such that they have the greatest
individual voting power, but not class voting power. Class voting power is
limited by the pyramidal organizational structure where more senior
ranks are smaller in number.
There are compelling reasons to argue that the class of voters with
the greatest voice should be the senior and middle managers, the layers
below the highest executive ranks. 152 This group is large in most
businesses. They connect the shop floor with the executive suite. They
have management responsibilities, tasked with executing the strategies
given down from above. They have broad organizational awareness, and
a good sense of connecting corporate strategy with tactical understanding.
They dream of climbing higher the corporate hierarchy, high enough to
earn the keys to the executive suites; yet they are not so far removed from
the bottom tier to have lost a sense of economic proportion. They report
directly to senior executives, and the managerial rank exchanges vital
See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992) (analyzing the difference between rules and standards and their best
application).
152
“Midlevel management knows how well the company is functioning on a daily
basis and which parts of the company’s structure needs additional work.” Adams, supra
note 12, at 432.
151
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information. They are in routine contact with outside constituencies such
as suppliers and customers. They are important inputs for gauging morale,
and influence broader rank and file morale.
Middle and seniors managers collectively know much about the state
of the corporation, its trajectory, and the cause and effect of corporate
leadership, and in many cases they collectively know more than their
individual superiors. They are the leaders in the trenches of the firm, and
their collective opinions should not be underestimated even at the rarified
board level, though as a practical matter it is difficult for boards to get
direct information in this regard.
While the rank and file worker who earns $25,000 may not be an
informed voter in some respect, the same may not be said for the $250,000
non-executive vice president responsible for a market segment or a
product. Such a person would have significant information on the state of
the company, how the senior executives are managing the company, and
ultimately the performance of the CEO. Furthermore, the class of vice
presidents on the same level would hold a substantial quantum and
quality of the firm’s total information.
Based on the foregoing reasons, a stylized example of a voting
allocation might look something like this: 20% the general workforce, 60%
middle and senior managers, and 20% senior officers. In this scheme, fully
80% of the voting power is allocated to the managerial ranks, though the
managerial rank is not the same as the rank of senior executives whose
compensation are subject to the board’s decision. I note that there is no
“correct” proportion, but a range of reasonable voting allocations.
C.

Gamed Voting

Whenever there is consequential voting, there lurks a potential
problem of gaming. There are two kinds of gaming problems here. The
first is where the allocation of votes can stack the deck in favor of the CEO.
This is structural gaming in which the structure of the scheme determines
the outcome. The second is internal gaming in which the vote is affected
by the employee’s internal motivations apart from incentive to monitor.
These gaming effects are related.
Confidentiality in voting is important since retaliation can be a real
risk, particularly at the senior ranks.153 An employee may be rationally
fearful if confidentiality cannot be assured. Rank and file employees
See id. at 431, 437 (stressing the importance of anonymity in full-circle evaluations
where subordinates are evaluating supervisors).
153
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would have less to fear. Would a CEO fire some random assembly line
worker in a far-flung operation due to a negative vote? Such fear would
be more grounded in reality among the senior and managerial ranks, and
these ranks are important to elicit information.
Confidentiality can be breached through deductive analysis of voting
outcomes if voting allocation is structurally gamed. While it would be
impossible for anyone to know how a specific low level employee voted
based on voting results, deductive analysis can reveal the votes or voting
patterns of employees with significant voting power.
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose there are four classes
of employees below the top executives whose compensations are subject
to board approval and public disclosure. The corporate hierarchy has four
levels: class A is the senior executives, class B senior non-executive
managers, class C middle managers, and class D the general workforce.
The class voting allocations are: 20% (A), 28% (B), 30% (C), and 22% (D).
Each class has the following number of employees and votes.
Employee
Class

Number of
Employees

Votes per
Individual

Individual
Voting Power

Votes per
Class

Class Voting
Power

A
B
C
D

1
2
5
11

10
7
3
1

20%
14%
6%
2%

10
14
15
11

20%
28%
30%
22%

Total

19

na

na

50

100%

Suppose the compensation package was voted down, receiving 30
“against” votes, which is 60% of the total votes. It is impossible to know
how the lower level employees voted, and from the CEO’s perspective she
may not care as much. The CEO works most closely with the executives
and senior managers—the three employees in classes A and B. Since these
three hold 24 votes, it is a mathematical certainty that at least one of them
voted “against.” Also, it is unlikely that only one voted “against.” If the
class A employee voted “against” (10 votes), then the remaining 20
“against” votes must have come from the collective 26 votes held at
classes C and D, which is perhaps an unlikely 77% majority of the lower
two classes. If the one negative vote was from a class B employee (7 votes),
then the remaining 23 “against” votes must have come from the 26 votes
at classes C and D, which is a highly unlikely 88% majority of the lower
two classes. These outcomes are plausible, but in varying degrees unlikely.
A CEO can be confident that the most like possibility is that two of the
three employees in classes A and B—those employees who are the closest
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to her—voted “against.” If the CEO had other information as well, for
example, past dealings, personal interactions, and emotional intuitions,
the identities of the “against” voters could be fairly obvious. By voting
“against”, these employees would not have enhanced their career
prospects. A CEO who correctly perceives that a majority of her
management team does not have confidence in her can solve the problem
by replacing the team. Thus, under this voting structure, higher class
employees would have incentive to internally game the vote irrespective
of her opinions on the company’s prospects and the CEO’s performance.
Such deductive reasoning quickly loses efficacy when the voting
permutations increase due to greater number of voters and decreased
concentration of voting powers. As the saying goes, there is safety in
numbers. Consider a more complex organization with the identical voting
allocations by employee rank. The class voting allocations are exactly the
same above: 20% (A), 28% (B), 30% (C), and 22% (D). But there are now
more employees and thus each employee’s voting power has been diluted
significantly.
Employee
Class

Number of
Employees

Votes per
Individual

Individual
Voting Power

Votes per
Class

Class Voting
Power

A
B
C
D

2
4
6
22

10
7
5
1

10%
7%
5%
1%

20
28
30
22

20%
28%
30%
22%

Total

34

na

na

100

100%

Suppose again that there are 60% “against” votes constituting 60
votes. It is not clear what combination of voters produced the 60%
outcome. Some combination of six employees at classes A and B must
have voted no, but it is unclear who they may be. Again, intuitions and
insights from personal dealings may shed some light, but the conclusions
may be far less reliable. Much of the deductive reasoning power loses
efficacy when votes become confidential due to the ability to hide in
numbers.
These simple examples can be generalized to the situations at
corporations of various sizes. These examples show that gaming is less
problematic at larger corporations than smaller ones due to the increased
number of voters. Unless the allocation is clearly gamed at larger
corporations, the problem of voting transparency is not so significant.
However, giant multinational corporations exist at one end of the size
spectrum of public companies. There are many smaller and midcap public
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companies where employees and managers may know each other broadly
and intimately. In these cases, a concern for confidentiality would be real.
These simple examples also show the relationship between gaming
and confidentiality. Gaming can achieved through the structure of the
scheme: i.e., giving the employees most likely to vote in favor the most
number of votes, which for a CEO would be the highest executive level
employees. Gaming can also be internally influenced: i.e., employees
voting strategically for self-interested reasons, which affect the highest
executive level employees the most. Absent discord at the highest ranks,
we would expect that senior executives would be most inclined to support
the CEO’s pay package, particularly since they would identify with the
CEO as they aspire to that level as well. The highest ranking employees
have the greatest incentive to monitor company performance and the best
inside information, which are reasons why they should have the most
votes. Yet too much concentration of voting may result in gaming. The
best voting allocation would balance these considerations.
D.

Implementation

Despite the framework based on shareholder say-on-pay, several
issues are unique to employee voting. The problems are conceptualizing
the corporate hierarchy for the purpose of vote allocation, the right to vote
for foreign employees, and the mechanics of voting.
Corporations have organizational charts and are defined by a
hierarchical system of titles, functions, responsibilities, and powers.
Conceptualizing the organization is not a difficult problem. The systems
of human resources departments are in place to organize a voting scheme.
The asserted difficulty of the task is simply a reflection of the strength of
the objection.
Although a U.S. public company may have sprawling international
operations, voting should be limited to U.S.-based employees. The
practical reason is that wage standards across the globe vary radically.154
In terms of monitoring capabilities and inside information, U.S.-based
employees of U.S. firms would probably be better, generally speaking,
For example, in 2011 the average Chinese worker earned approximately 42,000
yuan per year, which is approximately $6,900 (at a conversion rate of 1 yuan to $0.16).
Wages in China, China Labour Bulletin (June 10, 2013) (noting that the average worker
made
3,500
yuan
monthly
in
2011),
available
at
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china. This figure is significantly lower than
the average U.S. worker pay. See supra note 29 & accompanying chart.
154
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since they are likely to be more knowledgeable about the state of the
company. For example, American employees of General Motors may be
more knowledgeable about the company than their counterparts in China,
and German employees of Volkswagen may have the same advantage
over employees in Mexico. For U.S. companies, the information quality
provided by U.S.-based employees would generally be better due to
knowledge gained from closer physical, informational, and relational
proximities.
The most difficult implementation issue is the judgment that would
go toward allocating votes. The board should have discretion to exercise
business judgment, subject to regulatory guidelines against gaming, to
allocate votes within the corporate hierarchy in a way that achieves
informed voting. The regulation can be in the form of a report and
proposal to the SEC, subject to agency consent, discussing the
corporation’s organization, categorization of employees, vote allocation
assignments per category, and the rationale for the particular assignments.
As difficult as allocating votes may be, the exercise of judgment on
difficult matters is what boards and executives are paid to do.
Unlike shareholders voting which occurs through an existing proxy
process, a company must create a new voting process to achieve employee
say-on-pay. This raises the questions of cost. Under the standard theory,
agency cost is defined as the sum of the contracting cost between principal
and agent, monitoring cost by the principal, the bonding cost by the agent,
and the residual loss.155 This theory suggests that some rent extraction by
CEOs may be efficient (economically tolerable) if the monitoring costs of
such behavior is greater than the rent extracted.156
The cost of establishing voting, while significant, will not be high
relative to the issue at stake. Organizational structure already exists, and
the most difficult aspect of constructing a voting scheme is the exercise of
judgment. Voting would not be a mandatory condition of employment,
but like political voting a voluntary act of participation.
Voting can be done electronically. Corporations can easily create a
voting portal in which employees can login through a company-issued
identification, such as a password or social security number, and vote on
the package.157 Corporations can achieve amazing feats of organization,
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at 308; see MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE
FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2000).
156
See supra note 137.
157
See Adams, supra note 12, at 432 (stating that full-circle evaluations can be
administered through the internet “without much added cost”).
155

36-58

data collection, analysis, and use of information technology. 158 An
objection that voting would be technologically infeasible or too costly as a
direct expenditure would defy credibility based on everyday observations
of the routine use of information technology by many parts of society
including business corporations.
In conclusion, the implementation of employee say-on-pay is quite
feasibility. The real issue is whether employee say-on-pay would produce
better corporate governance as to executive compensation, and whether
these benefits are outweighed by the objections to the idea. These issues
are discussed in the next two sections.
III. BENEFITS OF EMPLOYEE SAY
A.

Advantage of Private Information

The principal rationale for employee say-on-pay is that employees
hold the corporation’s entire information content. The advantage of
employees as monitors compared to shareholders is apparent when we
consider the question of information through the lens of market efficiency.
Economists have classified levels of market efficiency: strong, semi-strong,
and weak forms of efficiency.159 The weak form is the hypothesis that past
information such as stock prices has been incorporated into the current
stock price, and it is certainly correct. 160 The semi-strong form is the
hypothesis that stock price adjust immediately to all publicly available
information. There is a question of whether the market is always semistrong efficient,161 but one can say without controversy that the market
See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?,
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2009) (discussing how credit card companies can predict individual
consumer behavior through data collection and analysis).
159
See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (proposing that there are three types of market efficiency,
which are strong, semi-strong, and weak forms of efficiency). See generally Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1983)
160
FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND
INSTRUMENTS 291 (4th ed. 2009).
161
See id. (“Evidence on whether the stock market is price efficient in the semistrong form is mixed.”); WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 36 (7th ed. 2012) (“The number of EMH supporters in the financial economic
community has dwindled.”); Robert J. Shiller, We'll Share the Honors, and Agree to Disagree,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013) (“have argued that the theory makes little sense, except in fairly
trivial ways. Of course, prices reflect available information. But they are far from
158

37-58

often rapidly incorporates publicly disclosed information such as press
releases, disclosures, and annual reports. 162 The strong form is the
hypothesis that market price of stock incorporates all public and private
information, and this version of market efficiency is certainly not
correct.163 With this broad outline of the efficient market hypothesis in
mind, one must conclude that, even if shareholder voting is informed, it
can only be based on publicly available information.
On the other hand, employees have not only all of the information
available to shareholders (many are themselves shareholders), but they
also have private information. “Private information” is not a reference to
legally prohibited information,164 but instead information relevant to the
performance of the firm and its executives that are not readily accessible
to the public. These kinds of information may include knowledge of
specific matters of business operations and strategy, more generalized
information on the sense of organizational “well-being,” and company
morale, which is relevant as an indicator of past and present firm
performance and expectation of future performance. Under specific
perfect.”). The presumption of market efficiency is the basis for the fraud-on-the-market
theory of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud actions. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988). There are nuances to market efficiency, such the degree and time responsiveness
in which public information is absorbed, that are important in securities actions. See
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WISC.
L. REV. 151; Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Baruch Lev & Meiriing de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and
10b–5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV 7, 20 (1994). These
nuances are not relevant for the discussion here.
162
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014) (“Even
the foremost critics of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis acknowledge that public
information generally affects stock prices.”).
163
“No one these days accepts the strongest version of the efficient capital market
hypothesis, under which non-public information automatically affects prices. That
version is empirically false: the public announcement of news (good and bad) has big
effects on stock prices, which could not happen if prices already incorporated the effect of
non-public information.” West v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir.
2002) (Easterbrook, J.). See, e.g., Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger
Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981)
(showing rapid rise of stock price to reflect merger announcements and acquisition
premiums); Leslie A. Jeng, Andrew Metrick & Richard Zeckhauser, Estimating the Returns
to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective, 85 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 453
(2003) (finding abnormal returns of more than 6% per year from insider purchase).
Indeed, if the strong form of market efficiency was correct, there would be no need for
insider trading laws since insiders would not be able to profit from private information.
164
See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (involving
misappropriation of confidential information under the securities laws).
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information concerning or leading to inferences of these matters are
publicly disclosed, they are private information held only by the collective
employees. Under employee say-on-pay, private information would be
reflected in the voting results.
If one believes that there is a perfect correlation between information
that is readily publicly available, such as public disclosures and press
releases, and the private information held by employees (that is, the
strong form of market efficiency), there would be no rationale for
employee say-on-pay on efficiency grounds. However, no company is
perfectly transparent, and private information always exists.
Shareholder and employee say-on-pay would work at different levels
of market efficiency. Shareholders are most likely to vote “no” when share
prices are declining and as a result can be said to reflect the publicly
available information. If employees have a vote, they would be most likely
to vote “no” when the information they hold on the executive’s role in the
corporation’s past performance and expectation of the future conflicts
with the pay package. This would be private information flowing into the
voting mechanism.
B.

Reverse Monitoring

Employee say-on-pay serves as reverse monitoring of executive
performance and pay. Employees are said to have many roles, including
citizens at work, stakeholders, human capital, and investors.165 Employees
can also be monitors of executives. Reverse monitoring is the idea that
employees are monitors of their peers including their supervisors, and not
just the targets of monitoring by the company.166 Typically, we think of
the evaluation and monitoring in the corporate hierarchy as a sequence of
top-down processes emanating from the board to the senior officers, and
progressively going down toward the base of the pyramid. But in reality
monitoring can be multidirectional.
The application of reverse monitoring is seen in different contexts. It
has been suggested that, contrary to conventional wisdom that stock
options impart ownership incentives on employees, employee stock
options promote a reverse monitoring function, wherein employees are
incentivized to monitor peer misconduct or shirking to avoid a decline in

Arthurs & Mummé, supra note 21, at 352-67.
Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based
Compensation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24, 1446 (2007).
165
166
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the value of their options.167 Also, whistleblower protections and qui tam
actions are based on the idea that employees can monitor the corporation
and their peers for wrongdoing on behalf of the corporation or the
public.168 It is wise policy to give employees the incentives and the means
to monitor organizational governance.169
Reverse monitoring is not a radical concept. It is widely used in
corporations. Many major public corporations routinely use “full-circle”
or 360 evaluations where subordinates evaluate the performance of their
supervisors.170 Such evaluations steadily gained acceptance in the 1980s
and 1990s both as a decisionmaking tool and a method for evaluating
management.171 Full-circle evaluations provide crucial information on the
performance of senior managers by those they supervise. The only thing
radical in the concept of employee say-on-pay is that the top corporate
officer would be subject to firm-wide evaluation by all subordinates. But it
is not clear why the CEO and senior executives, being an employee as well,
should be inherently exempt from such evaluations. Voting would simply
formalize opinions already held. It is true that boards evaluate senior
executives, but they require information to do so.
The idea that employees can serve as monitors of peers and superiors
is based on the plain fact that they possess all of the information content of

Id. at 1423-25. The idea is that individual employees can do more harm to the
corporation than they can increase value. Stock options incentivize reverse monitor by
employees whose options may be subject to destruction of value by other employees. Id.
168
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 922 (providing whistleblower protection); SarbanesOxley Act § 806 (same); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (providing for qui tam
action for fraud against the U.S. government).
169
See Hannes, supra note 166, at 1424 (“It is hard to imagine anyone in a better
position to fulfill this [monitoring] mission [than employees], and because their duties do
not include this task, it is wise to give them an incentives to do so . . . .”). See also Orly
Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 433 (2009) (discussing the role of employees in ensuring the legality and
compliance obligations of organizations).
170
See Adams, supra note 12, at 429-35. Companies like Walt Disney, General Motors,
American Airlines, Intel, DuPont, IBM, and RCA have used full-circle evaluations. Id. at
431, 433. According to one survey, 90% of Fortune 1000 companies surveyed had
implemented some form of full-circle or multisource evaluation system. Id. at 433 (citing
Mark R. Edwards & Ann JU. Ewen, How to Manage Performance and Pay with 360-Degree
Feedback, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., May/June 1996, at 41). See H. John Bernardin &
Richard W. Beatty, Can Subordinate Appraisals Enhance Managerial Productivity?, 28 SLOAN
MANAGEMENT REV. 63 (1987) (arguing for giving employees “voice” in the performance
evaluation of their supervisors).
171
Adams, supra note 12, at 429.
167
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the firm.172 Not even the CEO would possess this quantity of information,
and certainly the board would not. Shareholders are incapable of
observing everything a manager does and is limited to public information.
But employees benefit from direct observation and private or difficult to
acquire information. Their vote would express this information content.
Since this inside information o is valuable, 173 the rationale for reverse
monitoring is compelling.
When employees are monitoring peers or supervisors, monitoring is
costless and requires only awareness.174 But one may question the quality
of the information. In large corporations, direct observations cannot be
made in some circumstances. Most CEOs would be incompetent to
evaluate most employees in the company due to the fact that they would
not have personal observations arising from direct professional dealings.
As a factual corollary, most employees are not in day-to-day contact with
the CEO and other senior executives. So does this mean that employees
would be equally incompetent? No, the symmetry does not hold.
Interpersonal dealings with the CEO do not define the directness of
observation for the purpose of monitoring and evaluation. There is direct
assessment in the sense that employees execute the decisions of the CEO
and observe the influence of such decisions on the corporate performance
and prospects. Information in a corporation is not like water, always
flowing downwards; it is like air, ubiquitous in the complex networks of
professional relationships and organizational processes. All employees
have organizational awareness resulting from being a part of the firm’s
complex information flow. Information is transmitted and received multidirectionally in a complex organization. 175 The general sense of the
collective employees is often accurate.176 One need not be a historian to
“[I]nformation is always more complete and reliable within the firm than outside
it.” PHAN, supra note 16, at 15.
173
Existence of inside corporate information is the basis for the prohibition against
insider trading. See id. at 15 (arguing that insider trading laws prohibit benefiting from
inside information, which is superior to public information available to non-insider
investors).
174
Hannes, supra note 166, at 1424.
175
See CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 104-11 (1938)
(describing the networks of relationships and communication channels in a complex
organization and showing the mathematical permutations of relationships within a firm).
176
See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WIDOM OF CROWDS (2005) (discussing how
large groups of people accurately observe, assess, or solve better than a few individuals).
Cf. Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets,
Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 524 n.437 (discussing the ability of
172
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understand that there have been countless instances in history in which
leaders of organizations—be they military, corporations, civic, or
governments—have lost the confidence of their subordinates for reasons
that have proved to be well founded.
It is doubtful that the board, as a collective group working part-time
as board do, would know more about the performance of the CEO than
the collective employees including the cadre of middle and senior
managers, and the senior executive team. From the perspective of
information, the problem for the board becomes greater as the corporation
increases in size and complexity, and as the board increasingly relies on
information provided by the CEO and the outside advisers hired by the
senior executives. Since employees possess highly relevant information,
full-circle evaluations can serve a reverse monitoring role in evaluating
the compensation packages of senior executives.177
Lastly, there is a special form of monitoring and assessment that may
have particular usefulness in executive compensation. In some instances,
executive compensation may be so patently excessive based on absolute
amount 178 or in relation to firm performance 179 or the average worker
pay.180 These cases may be subject to a collective sensibility, something
like Justice Potter Stewart’s famous quip on pornography “I know it when
I see it,”181 a visceral reaction to something obscene that may serve as a
useful standard in extreme cases. Although even gross excessiveness of
pay may prove to be too little to overcome shareholder inertia (at least
sufficient to obtain a majority negative vote), monitoring by employees
may be effective. Employee say-on-pay might be particularly useful in
the futures markets to predict accurately on a probabilistic basis political and sporting
outcomes).
177
Cf. Adams, supra note 12, at 435, 437 (arguing that institutional investors use fullcircle evaluations from middle managers, among others, to evaluate the compensation
packages of senior executives).
178
See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006)
(noting that corporate executive was paid approximately $130 million for 14 months of
work).
179
See, e.g., Annie Lowry, Pay Still High at Bailed-Out Companies, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013) (reporting that executive compensation was high even for financial
firms bailed out during the financial crisis).
180
See, e.g., Elliot Blair Smith & Phil Kuntz, CEO Pay 1,795-to-1 Multiple of Wages
Skirts U.S. Law, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2013) (reporting that the CEO of J.C. Penney’s was
paid $53.3 million while the average employee was paid $29,688), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-30/ceo-pay-1-795-to-1-multiple-of-workersskirts-law-as-sec-delays.html.
181
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).

42-58

unusual or outlier cases in which there is no reasonable explanation for
the size of the pay other than board capture and failure of proper
contracting.
C.

Information Asymmetry in Governance

A well-known paradox of corporate governance is that the board is
the ultimate managerial authority charged with “managing” the senior
executives, 182 but the latter possesses far greater information. 183 The
typical board meets 4 to 6 times a year for an average of 4 hours per
meeting. 184 Information is the source of power and influence in the
corporation. Practically, senior executives have significant power in the
corporation and influence the board’s thinking and actions. The ultimate
source of management power is the distinct information asymmetry
between the board and the management.185 If the board had the same or
superior information, it could always second-guess or countermand
management opinions, recommendations, and decisions.
Much of the corporation’s information is held below, synthesized,
and then sent upwards in the corporate hierarchy in the reporting process.
In most corporate hierarchies the board would not have much contact
with employees at lower levels in the routine course of managing the
business and affairs of the corporation. This is not a failing of boards per
se. Consider a corporation that has 50,000 employees, 1,000 of whom are
non-executive managers. Not only do board members have day jobs, but
their numbers are woefully insufficient for operational management.
Operational management is the job of the senior officers. The liability
scheme in corporation law recognizes the reality that the board, albeit
ultimate managers, cannot directly engage the largest segment of
management.186
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).
PHAN, supra note 16, at 145. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 295 (5th ed. 2011) (“Directors can never know as much about the operation
of the company as management, so they are dependent on the CEO for being supplied
with accurate, timely, and material information.”).
184
PHAN, supra note 16, at 37.
185
Id. at 146.
186
A failure of the duty to monitor is “possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” In re Caremark
Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). In Delaware, the standard is
“a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system.” Id. at 971.
182
183
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We should not mistake infeasibility of operational management with
irrelevance of information that could be gotten or undesirability of such
oversight if such active management could hypothetically occur. Consider
the agency problem of monitoring corporate executives through the lens
of the Coase Theorem. In the context of legal entitlements, if transaction
costs were zero, parties would rearrange their rights in a way that
maximizes efficiency irrespective of the initial assignment of the rights.187
But once transaction costs are considered, the rearrangement of rights
only occurs if the increase in production exceeds the cost of bringing
about this reordering.188 A lesson drawn is that the law should initially
assign rights in a way that reflects the hypothetical bargain of the
parties.189 Organizational law can be analyzed from this perspective as
well.190
One can analyze the agency cost problem of monitoring corporate
executives through a Coasean prism. If monitoring costs were zero, the
board would vigorously monitor and manage executives. This monitoring
would entail acquiring and analyzing information held in the firm. The
board would solicit information from employees, in the very same way
that senior executives solicit information from subordinates. Since the real
world has monitoring cost, such operational management is infeasible.
However, if information conveyance can be cost effective, the board
would benefit. One such device is employee say-on-pay. The point is
fairly obvious: Would employees have something to add in a hypothetical
board deliberation on the CEO’s performance if the interchange and
monitoring costs were low?
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-7, 15 (1960).
Id. at 15-16. Unless the initial arrangement of rights established by the legal
system is efficient, “the costs of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights
through the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the
greater value of production which it would bring, may never be achieved.” Id. at 16.
189
Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 566 (2009). Courts have used the analytic heuristic of
an ex ante hypothetical transaction to determine the most efficient rule of law. See, e.g.,
Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (noting that
“[h]ypothetical-contract analysis is a powerful tool for understanding tort law and
determining its scope”); Bamford v. Turnley, (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (Exch.), rev'g
(1860) 122 Eng. Rep. 25 (Q.B.) (analyzing nuisance case from hypothetical decision of
individual owner of properties in question).
190
See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 37 (2010) ( “When filling
gaps in the corporate contracts, courts cannot look to the actual intent of thousands of
parties so they make up a hypothetical ‘intent’ based on what the courts view as
reasonable.”).
187
188
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Say-on-pay is a modest device that provides a more diverse mix of
information to the board. An important aspect of say-on-pay is the
quantum of information: a simple percentage signifying approval or
disapproval. Shareholder say-on-pay provides direct, relevant input on
the opinion of shareholders. This opinion is based on market and public
information. Employee say-on-pay remedies the problem of information
asymmetry between board and management by providing direct, relevant
input on the opinion of employees.
In the ideal world of zero monitoring costs, the board would gather
information from both senior management and employees.191 Employee
say-on-pay provides relevant information that is relatively costless. In this
way, it helps to offset the informational power of management over the
board, which can promote board capture and work against good
corporate governance.
D.

Fiduciary Ideals, Board Cover and Leverage

Employee say-on-pay promotes fiduciary ideals. The “board capture”
criticism asserts that corporate governance has broken down in the realm
of executive compensation. The board is a fiduciary of the corporation.
While the legal rules of corporate governance make it exceedingly difficult
to impose remedies for the board’s breach of fiduciary duty, legal rules are
distinct from fiduciary ideals.192 In a world of ontological truth, there can
be no doubt that there are many instances in which fiduciary duties are
not in fact kept. In any adjudication, the probable and the provable are not
always the same.193 Adjudications in corporation law are not so special
that they rise above the indisputable limitations of the adjudicatory
process. 194 In fact, corporation law is analogous to criminal law in the
In some companies, the board has complete access to employees according to
their corporate governance guidelines. For example, the board of Intel has complete
access while the board of General Motors is restricted in its access by management. PHAN,
supra note 16, at 172-73.
192
Commentators have suggested that corporate law incorporates standards of
conduct as opposed to legal rules of liability. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware Corporation Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
193
See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).
194
For example, the old chestnut, Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807
(1976), can be understood from the divide between the probable and the provable. “It can
be explained by improper but unprovable motives such as a vain attempt to support
short-term stock prices for the purpose of executive compensation, or obfuscating the
191

45-58

sense that legitimate and overriding policy considerations, as seen in the
burdens of proof and presumptions respectively, produce numerous
adjudicatory errors from the perspective of ontological truth.195
In the realm of executive compensation, the fiduciary ideal is simple:
the board should award compensation free of structural bias in favor of
management, informed with all public and private information available,
and based on performance. In this respect, employee say-on-pay promotes
fiduciary ideals. It communicates relevant information in a manageable
form at low cost. It is simply an added measure of informed
decisionmaking, which is the hallmark of the fiduciary duty of care.196
In corporate governance, there is a symbiotic relationship between
the board and the management. Boards depend on management. A
negative aspect of this co-dependency is structural bias. The problem is
not difficult to fathom. CEOs have significant influence on board
compensation and nominations. Insider board members, such as senior
executives, are subject to the CEO’s authority in their roles as officers. The
board is a social institution populated by an elite group of individuals
who routinely interact with each other in their business, social, and
political worlds.197 Although a genial and collegial working relationship
between the board and the management is a good thing, it would also
lead to structural bias.198
A number of devices tend to offset structural bias and empower the
board’s independence. Board members are subject to fiduciary duty. 199
nature of a failed investment which would have been made clearer with the recognition
of a loss. Thus, Kamin can be seen as an unprovable duty of loyalty case that had to be
brought as a duty of care case.” Rhee, supra note 61, at 1149 n.56.
195
By “error,” I do not mean honest mistakes based on hindsight, but instead
violations of fiduciary duty that go undetected or unproven due to the height of the legal
hurdles.
196
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
197
See generally Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1259 (2005) (discussing the social environment of a board and the
resulting behavior of board members).
198
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 61-79 (discussing structural bias in
compensation); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith , and Structural
Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007) (discussing structural bias in compensation and the Disney
compensation litigation). See also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural bias, Special Litigation
Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1307-09 (2005)
(discussing “structural bias”).
199
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A. 2d 345 (Del. 1993).
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They routinely retain outside advisers on various matters such as lawyers
and financial advisers. There are legal requirements on the appointment of
independent directors,200 the composition of important committees of the
board,201 and board deliberation procedures.202
Say-on-pay can counteract structural bias as well. The board gets
information independent of management control. A board would find it
uncomfortable to ignore a negative vote of shareholders or employees.
The sense of public accountability would be great. Ignoring the concern of
employees, particularly arising from the management ranks, would be
detrimental to business operations. To do so, the board could be viewed as
insensitive to employees, which poses a business problem. If excessive
executive compensation is a possibility due to structural bias, employee
say-on-pay could offset some of this bias.
Employee vote can provide cover for the board’s compensation
decision. A board may want to award high compensation in a facially
difficult situation for proper reasons. Or, it may not want to award high
compensation but the social, political, and bargaining situation is complex.
A normative basis for engaging in compensation negotiation would be
helpful.203
Consider a facially difficult situation. The board of a distressed
company proposes to award a CEO with high compensation. Depending
on the circumstance, a board could rightly award high compensation to a
CEO of a troubled company. Management talent would be needed to right
the ship, and such talent would have opportunity costs. Good executives
may have other better opportunities and may be wary of entering into a
bad situation unless the incentives compensate for those foregone
opportunities. These situations can be politically difficult internally and

See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Listing Rule 303A.01 (“Listed companies
must have a majority of independent directors.”).
201
See, e.g., id. Listing Rule 303A.04(a) (“Listed companies must have a
nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent
directors.”); id. Listing Rule 303A.05(a) (“Listed companies must have a compensation
committee composed entirely of independent directors.”).
202
See, e.g., id. Listing Rule 303A.03 (“To empower non-management directors to
serve as a more effective check on management, the non-management directors of each
listed company must meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions without
management.”).
203
See G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 89-114 (2d ed. 2006) (suggesting that various kinds of leverage
exist to bargain successfully).
200

47-58

externally. But suppose employees, properly recognizing the situation,
votes positively. Upon a favorable vote, who can complain?
Consider the case where a board seeks to reign in compensation for
rational reasons, but has complex considerations in scaling back executive
pay.204 Working against the board’s inclination on executive pay may be
the social bonds between board members and the CEO, a prior history of
high wages, CEO influence on particular board members such as insider
members, and a reticence to disturb collegiality. Many of these factors
create the structural bias in favor of deference to CEOs. In this situation, a
negative employee vote can give the board leverage in an arms-length
negotiation, and also provide cover for the decision to reduce
compensation.
E.

Public Monitoring and Political Legitimization

At current levels, executive compensation is seen by academics,
politicians, and the public as illegitimate. Controlling the levers of
corporate power, CEOs have distributed greater portions of the
corporation’s production to themselves while employees shared less. The
public has come to view executive compensation as rent extraction gained
through the power of position, unconstrained by personal qualms. 205
Executive compensation has become a public issue. In addition to the
Dodd-Frank Act, there is the possibility of other public reforms. Reform of
compensation can be done through tax law.206 It can be done through flat
restrictions or caps on compensation. 207 In the extreme case, the
government can have a direct role in determining how much an executive
can pocket in compensation through special taxes or wage control.208
Employees would serve as public monitors and gatekeepers. Public
approval is needed to legitimate, socially and politically, high executive
compensation. Without this legitimacy, boards will continue to feel a
See PHAN, supra note 16, at 47-62 (presenting a case study of a company and
board that was highly influenced by the CEO).
205
See STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 42 (noting that CEOs have amassed riches through
“an enhanced ability to take more from the corporation that they are supposed to be
serving, and weaker qualms about, and enhanced public toleration of, doing so”).
206
See Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation,
85 N.C. L. REV. 571 (2007).
207
See Ingolf Dittman, Ernst Maug & Dan Zhang, Restricting CEO Pay, 17 J. CORP.
FIN. 1200 (2011).
208
See Landon Thomas, Jr., Britain to Levy a One-Time Tax on Banker Bonuses, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2009).
204

48-58

pervasive public pressure even as they continue to award high
compensation packages. It is difficult to predict how the problem will
ultimately play out. Will there be further regulatory scrutiny as the divide
between the very wealthy and the rest increases?
Even as CEOs are enjoying high compensation, there is longterm
uncertainty. Social cohesion in a corporation was stronger in the past than
it is now.209 Current compensation strikes discord in broad constituencies.
A compensation package should be broadly supported by the many
constituents of the corporation, including in the broadest sense the public.
“This is because executive compensation continues to be a hot button
issue among the unions, community activists, shareholder interests
groups, and institutional shareholders; it represents a powerful signaling
device.” 210 Employee say-on-pay can legitimate high executive
compensation. Suppose the CEO’s pay package was approved by
shareholders and employees, and informed by the advice a board
exercises its independent judgment and awards high compensation. What
would and should the public’s response be?
IV. OBJECTIONS TO EMPLOYEE SAY
A.

Information Quality

A potential objection to employee say-on-pay would be that
employee voting would not yield quality information. Instead, the vote
would be tainted by a number of irrelevant considerations: for example,
personal feelings toward the CEO, socio-political agendas of individual
workers or their unions, ignorant or uninformed voting, and class envy. A
key difference between shareholders and employees is that shareholders
vote with only criterion in mind—stock value. Employees may apply
multiple criteria. The objection goes to the reliability of the information
gotten from the voting results.
This objection is flawed. A firm is composed of a collection of its
employees, each holding a unique packet of information. In this respect, a
firm can be seen as an information market.211 If so, the voting outcome
See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 67.
PHAN, supra note 16, at 154.
211
See id. at 3 (“There is increasingly realization that a firm is a place where people
meet to exchange specific information for the purpose of engaging in production.”);
BARNARD, supra note 175, at 73, 82 (defining an organization as a system of consciously
coordinated activities persons within must communicate information with each other).
209
210
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would in many cases accurately reflect the collective opinions held. 212
Many opinions may be misguided or ill-informed, but systemic errors are
difficult to achieve since random errors tend to cancel each other. An
evaluation on the whole would reflect the overall information held within
the corporation.
Although employees may bring different perspectives, their criteria
would not be random. They would fairly reflect rank in the hierarchy. The
higher in the hierarchy an employee is, the more the criteria would seek to
evaluate the CEO’s job performance and the less they would be sensitive
to wage differential. Greater seniority promotes greater affinity and
identification with high paying jobs. There may be natural affinity
(structural bias) toward supporting executive pay.
At the lower levels, employees may pose a problem arising from
multiple criteria and perspectives. They are the lowest paid workers, and
thus would be naturally skeptical of high wages. On average, they may be
less educated and less informed about the state of the company than their
managers. They may be influenced by organized labor. They are the
furthest removed from direct dealings with the CEO. Their evaluations of
performance may be uninformed or suspect. The risk of the application of
more diverse criteria is greater in the lower ranks.
If the lower ranks are problematic, why permit voting at that level?
Despite the risks, the lowest rank and file employees serve three useful
functions in the overall scheme. First, there is a benefit to egalitarian
inclusion of all employees.213 The broader political legitimization function
of employee say-on-pay would require such voting. From a managerial
perspective, the exclusion of the majority of employees would be
demoralizing and undermine organizational cohesion. Second, natural
skepticism of high compensation, a systematic bias perhaps, would tend
to offset the structural bias held by senior executives. Third, when a CEO’s
pay is so large as to absolute amount or wage differential, the expression
of collective outrage would serve an important public and governance
function. These benefits outweigh the particular problems at the lower
rank and file level.
As discussed earlier, the balance of these considerations suggests a
weighed voting scheme. Neither rank and file employees nor senior
executives have the controlling block of votes. That block should be held
by the middle and senior nonexecutive managerial ranks. The assigned
See SUROWIECKI, supra note 176.
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 18, at 76-105 (describing the benefit of loyalty
engendered by members having participatory voice in an organization).
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weights acknowledge the potential risks to information quality. One must
assume that on the whole employees evaluate each other in good faith,
and that good faith is not dependent on the directionality of the
evaluation, that is, whether it is top-down or bottom-up. Nor is good faith
inherently exclusive to senior executives and boards.
B.

Rationally Apathetic Employees

Like political citizens or corporate shareholders, employees may be
rationally apathetic. Like political voting, employees may think that the
personal cost-benefit of voting is not worth it, or that their single vote
(vote allocation) may not make a difference. Some employees may not
care at all about the issue at stake, or think that they have sufficient
information to make an informed vote. Some may consider the right a
chore without any tangible payoff.
There are significant differences between political or shareholder
voting and employee voting. In political voting, there is not an
insignificant cost, which is time off from work or leisure and trekking to
the voting booth. Employee voting is virtually cost free. Voting can be
done online. The most significant cost to the employee is the time used to
weigh the amount of pay with the executive’s performance. This
consideration, while real, is not time consuming in the mold of performing
financial analysis, assessing investment opportunities, and such. The
decision would not require spreadsheets of analyses. It would be in the
mold of an instantaneous judgment call: Given the company’s
performance and trajectory and the CEO’s responsibility for them, has the
CEO earned the proposed compensation? Employees will already have a
good sense of the company’s performance, trajectory, and the executive’s
performance. Due to weighed voting, those who have the best information
have greater voting power, and thus empowering the incentive to vote.
A problem with the rationally apathetic shareholder is that the
shareholder may not have very good information on the issues put to
them. The benefits of diversification increases the work required to be
informed. If so, this calls into question the informational quality of the
vote and the motivation to vote. Consider the most basic shareholder
governance function—voting on directors. Suppose the shareholder holds
a modestly diversified portfolio of 30 stocks214 and each company has a
See Meir Statman, How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio, 22 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANALYSIS 353, 355 (1987) (showing that a portfolio of 30 stocks would result in an
expected variance of under 20.87%, whereas a portfolio of 1000 stocks would result in an
214
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10-member board with no cross memberships. A shareholder may not
have good opinions about each of these 300 directors. Rational apathy and
situational ignorance may be related.
Employees are situated differently. They know a great deal about the
company, its competitors, its position in the competitive landscape, and its
trajectory. In many companies, the information flow within the firm is
complex and efficient. Like blood in the body, information flows to the
necessary parts of the firm. Unlike shareholders and the many directors
and officers in their portfolios, employees will be greater information and
familiarity with the senior executives of the company. Since they have
more information and are better informed, and since their voting is almost
costless, the degree of apathy seen in shareholders will tend to be less in
employees.
Lastly, employees are more motivated to vote than shareholders.
They have undiversified firm-specific investment in their career. 215 In
cases where employees are vested in their careers and “exit” is far from
frictionless, 216 they will have incentive to vote and participate. This
incentive arises from different motivations and sentiments. Voting would
be almost cost free, and so the degree of shirking would be less. We can
also assume that as a collective whole, and unless morale has deteriorated,
employees care about their company and its prospects. The principle of
meritocracy undergirds the sense of fairness in a competitive market
society. Thus, employees would be motivated to speak on the issue of
fairness in wage and sharing of economic production.
C.

Balance in Corporate Governance

In U.S. corporate governance, employees have had little formal role.
Most boards of public companies do not have employee representatives,217
expected variance of 19.21%). See also Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market
Regulatory Failure, and the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 372 (2009)
(suggesting that significant diversification can be achieved with a mix of 30-35 stocks).
215
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investments: Explaining Anomalies
in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 738-39 (2006) (noting that employees make
undiversified firm-specific investments); ROE & BLAIR, at 58-87.
216
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 18, at 21-29 (describing a constituent’s choice of “exit”
or “voice” whenever an organization is perceived to be declining or unsatisfactory to the
member).
217
The U.S. corporate governance system is different from countries like Germany
that carves out a formal role for employees in its system of codetermination. See generally
JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN
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and senior executives typically view their relationship from a hierarchical
perspective where they transmit information and directives down the
chain of command. Corporate law does not prohibit a corporation from
establishing greater employee participation, but this is not the practice
among public companies. A potential objection may be that employee sayon-pay would significantly alter the balance of power in corporate
governance away from the traditional triad of board, management, and
shareholder. This concern is unfounded.
If the objection is that employee say-on-pay may influence the board,
this no objection at all. Legally, say-on-pay does not diminish or change
the board’s legal authority to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation. 218 It is an advisory vote. At most, say-on-pay exerts soft
constraints on the board’s virtually unfettered business judgment.
Ideally, say-on-pay should influence the board. When shareholders
leave the couch of apathy, their opinion on executive compensation is
relevant to the mix of information. Likewise, employee opinion is also
relevant. Unlike the board, employees observe the CEO daily. They
implement the CEO’s strategies and decisions, and they are in good
positions to assess the efficacy of corporate decisions, and the CEO’s
performance and leadership. These points are obvious and
uncontroversial. If so, why would directors in good faith not want to
know the opinion of employees in the process of being informed in their
decisionmaking?
One can imagine many situations in the past where information from
employees could have been helpful to the board. Could there have been
enough honest employees at Enron to give the board pause as to whether
Jeff Skilling was a good CEO? Would employees at WorldCom, charged
with integrating the many bad acquisitions the company made, have
properly expressed their views on Bernie Ebbers’ pay package? Business
history is replete with many examples when boards could have been
better served with information held by the collective employees. The
benefit of such information is particularly acute when there is a
substantial problem within the firm.
EXPERIENCE (2009) (discussing the German model of codetermination in which corporate
governance is legally shared with employees); ROE & BLAIR, at 163-238; David Charny,
The German Corporate Governance System, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 145 (1998) (same);
IRENE LYNCH FANNON, WORKING WITHIN TWO KINDS OF CAPITALISM: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEE STAKEHOLDING: US AND EU PERSPECTIVES (2003) (comparing
the European model of corporate governance, which has a greater role in employee
participation than the US model).
218
Dodd-Frank Act § 951.
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Communicating relevant information to the board is a core function
of corporate governance. Say-on-pay does not contain complex or
overwhelming amount of information. Employee say-on-pay does not tilt
the balance in corporate governance, formally or informally. It is
consistent with the ideal that boards are the ultimate managers but that
their decisions should be informed. In the final analysis, the provision of
relevant information to the board, so long as its assimilation is not so
taxing as to be counterproductive, is always a good thing.
D.

Employee “Hold Up”

Another objection could be that employee say-on-pay would create
an employee “hold up” problem. If compensation would depend in part
on employee approval, the tacit collusion may be that a CEO would be
incentivized to keep employees happy though this may undermine firm
profitability and shareholder value. She could raise salaries of employees
because this would narrow the wage disparity ratio. Or, she might not go
ahead with needed layoffs because it would be unpopular. Employee sayon-pay could be used as a coercive “hold up” device.
There is some merit to the “hold up” objection. If employee approval
is a factor in pay decisions, CEOs may become more sensitive to the
happiness and needs of employees. Are marginal increases in the wages of
corporate employees achieved through implicit quid pro quo such a bad
thing? With respect to the distribution of the corporation’s gains among
management, shareholders, and employees—the principal internal
constituents having claims on the production gains—if employees get a
little more than they currently get, it should not be a cause for alarm.
Minimum wage laws do precisely this as between shareholders and
employees, absent perfect pass-through to customers in the form
increased prices. It is true that the distributional effect is created by a
newly formed device of corporate governance. But so what? Currently,
executives get a lion’s share of the gain from production as among
employees.219 This raises an issue of equity and fairness in the corporate
enterprise. Laws often have such effect, including corporation law. 220
See supra note 29 and accompanying table (indicating that CEO pay has greatly
outpaced the income of workers).
220
Many rules in corporation law and corporate financing affect distribution. See,
e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm’n Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del.
Ch. 1991) (ruling that fiduciary duty shifts to creditors when the corporation is in the
zone of insolvency); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.Supp.
219
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There are many corporations in history 221 and currently 222 that pay
employees very well. A distributional effect from the current baseline is
not objectionable per se.
The “hold up” would become a bigger problem if CEOs are in effect
substantially captured by employees such that there are significant
questions of efficiency. Large business decisions and strategies—such as
mergers, layoffs, strategic outsourcing, labor contracts, etc.—should be
made in the interest of the corporate enterprise223 and not to the parochial
interests of management or labor. A merger not consummated to protect
employee interests may be just as bad a merger consummated to increase
the CEO’s empire and pay. But the risk of these concerns is minimal.
Firstly, rank and file employees should not be given the controlling
block of votes. The managerial ranks should be given the controlling block.
By virtue of a pyramidal corporate hierarchy, these employees constitute a
minority in numbers. They are already higher paid than most employees
in the firm. They are managers, think like managers, and would vote like
managers.
In important transactions, the considerations and influencing factors
may be much greater than the isolated interplay between management
and employees. CEOs report to the board. They are subject to market
pressures such as stock price, activist shareholders, and Wall Street. They
are influenced by the market for corporate control. 224 Like other
employees, they are influenced by concerns for their professional

1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that bondholders have no recourse for lost value when the
corporation engages in a leverage buyout); Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873
(Del.Ch. 1986) (ruling that bondholders have no recourse when the corporation engages
in a coercive exchange offer).
221
See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (noting that Henry
Ford wanted “to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to
the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes”); Henry
Ford’s $5-a-Day Revolution, available at http://corporate.ford.com/news-center/pressreleases-detail/677-5-dollar-a-day (noting that Henry Ford paid employees very well).
222
Investment banks typically pay their employees very high wages, which have
been typically in the range of 40% to 50% of net revenue. See supra note 138.
223
This is defined as the long-run value of the firm including the value of all
securities. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002).
224
See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965).

55-58

reputations and the next job, which is the market process of ex post
“settling up.”225
Assume, for example, the CEO is forced to do the one thing that will
alienate employees the most—layoffs. As a result, disaffected employees
vote against the CEO’s pay package, which is large because the board felt
it needed to incentivize a talented CEO and pay for her opportunity cost.
Two years have passed, and the drastic move turned out to the right one.
The company was saved and is moving toward financial health again.
Would a board deciding on compensation be able to put the negative
employee vote in the context of the situation and make an informed,
independent judgment on the merit of the pay? Yes, a professional board,
acting on an informed basis, would be able to contextualize the negative
vote by employees. One also suspects that in reporting process, the senior
management, the only internal group that has routine board access, would
duly explain why employees are unhappy with management and why
this unhappiness is not correlated with the best interest of the corporation.
In the final analysis, employee “hold up” at the margins is a good
thing or fairly harmless on the whole. Wage increases across the economy
might be a good thing since more equitable distribution of wealth may be
more efficient. 226 When there is a fundamental conflict between the
preferences of employees and corporate actions, employee “hold up” is
simply one of many factors that influence the CEO and that a board must
consider in determining executive compensation.
E.

Political Objections

If this Article reaches beyond academic discourse and into the public
sphere, as is the hope of any scholar seeking worldly influence, there will
be another objection. The most visceral objection may come from a
conviction that employees have no place in opining on the pay packages
of senior executives. Some CEOs may be threatened by the notion that
employees would be evaluating them and approving their pay packages.
There may be strongly held convictions on social and political order
See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 295-306 (1980) (suggesting that labor market should create proper incentives through
“ex post settling up”). But see Rhee, supra note 61, at 1176 (arguing that “the current
problem of excessive executive compensation calls into question whether this ‘settling up’
process is efficient, or even works when the amount of compensation diminishes an
executive's long-term incentives”).
226
See supra note 8.
225
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among some economic and business communities. These strong objections
would coalesce into a concentrated political interest group, which would
vigorously advocate against employee say-on-pay.227 This is the political
reality. Senior executives as a political interest group have not embraced
the concept of shareholder say-on-pay. Employee say-on-pay would run
into strong political headwinds. This objection is relevant as a pragmatic
matter. However, I do not believe that the politics of reform would be the
death knell of an otherwise good idea.
The idea of employee say-on-pay is pragmatic and politically feasible.
As with any major reform, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the DoddFrank Act, a public perception of the necessity of reform drives the
legislative process. The idea of employee say-on-pay will be prominent in
the academic and policy debate because it is legally and economically
sound in theory. One cannot predict the brew of political, economic and
social circumstances that would overwhelm strong political opposition. It
could be that social inequity reaches an intolerable point or another
corporate or financial crisis occurs, galvanizing further reform.
Also, the debate on executive pay is a global one. The idea of
employee say may have appeal in other parts of the economically
advanced world. Shareholder say-on-pay was first implement in the U.K.
and then rapidly adopted in continental Europe and other common law
countries, including now the U.S. In other developed economies in Europe,
the role of employees and labor in corporate governance is more
prominent than in the U.S. It is conceivable that employee say-on-pay may
be adopted first in other parts of the world, and then later imported into
America as was the case with shareholder say-on-pay. The fact that sayon-pay as a corporate governance phenomenon has been so widely
adopted across advanced economies suggest that there are limits to the
political power of corporate executives. That limitation also suggests that
employee say-on-pay is also politically feasible.
CONCLUSION
Berle and Means saw early the political dimensions of business, and
characterized business leaders as tinged with sovereign-like qualities. See ADOLF A. BERLE
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (reprint ed.
1991) (“The power attendant to such concentration has brought forth princes of industry,
whose position in the community has yet to be defined.”); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1932) (suggesting
that corporate executives operate “more as princes and ministers than as promoters or
merchants”).
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Few would dispute that in most companies the CEO should be the
highest paid employee, that they should be well compensated compared
to others for good performance, and that they should be entitled to
personal wealth after a lengthy successful tenure. However, the pay of a
single senior employee in a corporation raises the issue of corporate
efficiency and income inequity, and the broader spillover of these issues in
the public and political discourse. The case for employee say-on-pay is
compelling. Employees can monitor senior executive performance better
than shareholders because they possess inside information, and they have
direct incentive to monitor. Employee say-on-pay is feasible and cost
effective. Employee input leverages all of the information held in the
corporation, and it can assist the board in making an informed decision on
executive pay. Employee approval can also politically legitimize executive
compensation in an era in which executive pay and income inequity have
touched public consciousness.
The benefits of employee say-on-pay outweigh the objections.
Concerns about information quality can be controlled through weighed
voting. Employee say-on-pay does not fundamentally shift the balance of
power in corporate governance. Legal power still resides with the board,
but the board must now consider additional relevant factors in making an
informed decision. The interests of shareholders and employees are not
categorically inimical to each other. The use of employee input can be
used to advance the interest of shareholders in insuring that executive pay
is coupled to performance and does not reach grossly excessive levels.
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